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SUMMARY
As the title suggests, this thesis attempts a sociological analysis of the jural relation. 
In broad terms, it explores the sense in which relationality in human social behaviour 
is manifested in the concepts and conceptions which are ordinarily employed in legal 
thinking. It is argued that by conceiving of legal phenomena in terms of legal 
relationships rather than in terms of legal norms it is possible to attain an insight into 
the essentially social nature of such phenomena. To this end, the conceptual unit of 
the jural relation is taken to be the primary unit of social thinking or sociological 
theorising about law.
A fundamental assumption which underlies the study is that analytical jurisprudence 
and sociology of law lend themselves readily to syncretism. This possibility is 
explored in the context of Weber’s (apparent) dichotomy between the sociological 
point of view and the juridical point of view.
An expository presentation of Weber’s science of social action is the point of 
departure of the analysis. This serves as a conceptual framework within which the 
central arguments are presented and developed. Weber’s synthetic analytical construct 
of the ideal type is the primary theoretical device employed in the analysis. An 
attempt is made to formulate an ideal-type construct representing the perspective of 
an ultimate judicial actor.
It is argued that the conceptual apparatus of the jural relation is embedded in the 
subjective meaning of judicial social action. The jural relation is conceived of as an 
’emanation’ from the ultimate judicial actor outlined in the study. In accordance 
with Weber’s methodological stance, the causal dimension of judicial action is also 
briefly examined.
VAs a basis for an examination of the nature of human social action, and specifically, 
judicial social action, the normative component of action is explored. This involves a 
consideration of the sense in which the social norm becomes incorporated into the
subjective meaning of social action, functioning as a reference point for the
evaluation and orientation of the individual’s social action, and as a reference point 
for the evaluation by the individual of the action of others. A further function of 
the social norm - the regulative function - is seen to flow from the evaluative and 
orientative functions.
A model of a stable system of interaction is employed as a basis for discussion of the 
normative component of human action. It is argued that the essential features of a 
stable system of interaction are exhibited in the activity of playing a game such as 
chess, and accordingly this paradigm appears at various points in the discussion as a 
model for the analysis of the normative component of action.
The phenomenon of relationality as an aspect of the subjective meaning of social 
action is examined. The sense in which relationality is revealed in the structure of
the social norm is considered to be a first step towards the elucidation of the
normative relationship, a specific manifestation of which is the jural relation. The 
distinction between substantive and adjective normative relationality is explored in 
the context of the game paradigm in which an imaginary umpire assumes an 
adjudicatory function. This allows appropriate conclusions to be drawn as to the 
nature of the adjudicatory function.
A transition from the sociological notion of normative meaning to the jurisprudential 
notion of legal meaning is suggested. It is argued that in order to understand the 
meaning ascribed to human action, events or legally relevant ’facts’ for purposes of 
the mobilisation of a legal ’coercive apparatus’, it is essential to adopt the perspective 
of an hypothetical ultimate judicial actor, such as that postulated later in the thesis. 
Consideration is also given to the ascriptive nature of jural relations and the 
ascriptive nature of the process by which legal meaning is attached to legally relevant 
’facts’. The fundamental juridical elements of the jural relation are explored and the 
jural relation is considered, firstly, as social relationship, and secondly, as a 
relationship of social power. A brief presentation of the historical development of 
the conceptual apparatus of the jural relation serves as a foundation for an 
examination of the jural relation as expounded by Hohfeld and Kocourek, and their 
respective commentators. An analysis of the nature and structure of the Hohfeldian 
legal power differentiates the legal power from the legal right stricto sensu and also 
seeks to indicate the main points of convergence between the two generic concepts.
Finally, an outline is offered of the major structural elements of a Weberian 
ideal-type construct of an hypothetical judge, the incumbent of the ultimate judicial 
office. This outline attempts to define a theoretical perspective from which the 
process by which jural relations come to be ascribed may be ’visualised’. This outline 
serves to identify the defining features of the adjudicatory function and demonstrates 
how these features have a role in shaping and delimiting the conceptual apparatus of 
the jural relation. Consideration is thus given to the concept of the ’office’, the 
process of adjudication and the notion of ultimacy.
IINTRODUCTION AND OBJECT OF TH ESIS
1.1 Introduction
It is a fact of human experience that the social environment not only generates social 
norms, but also exerts pressure on individuals, often through human institutions and 
coercive agencies, to induce conformity to social norms, for the protection and 
advancement of diverse human interests, however conceived. The complexity of the 
normative arrangements which exist or evolve within the social environment for the 
identification, recognition, adjustment and reconciliation of individual and collective 
human interests is nowhere more clearly manifested than in the laws which human 
society creates for the regulation of the action of the individual in his relationships 
with others. 1
But it is a mistake to believe that legal norms (as a category of social norms) find their 
expression only in the form of simple imperatives such as ’thou shalt...’ or ’thou shalt 
not...’ or that legal thinking should ideally conceive of legal phenomena as ultimately 
reducible to particular legal norms, or types or combinations of legal norms. 2 
Although an attempt to reduce legal phenomena to legal norms or combinations of 
legal norms may appear on the face of it to reveal the ’true’ underlying nature of these 
phenomena, in fact this type of reductionism often conceals and occasionally distorts 
what is truly social about human social action: its relational quality. The sociological 
significance of the relationality of human social action has been recognised by the 
American sociologist Talcott Parsons:
2"Since a social system is a system of processes of interaction between actors, it is 
the structure of the relations between the actors as involved in the interactive 
process which is essentially the structure of the social system. The system is a 
network of such relationships." 8
But reductionism (of legal phenomena to legal norms) may also lead to distortion in 
another sense. It may, by failing to emphasise the importance of legal concepts within 
legal thinking, lead to the distortion of ordinary legal thinking by reducing to legal 
norms those legal concepts which are simply not reducible to one-dimensional artefacts 
of reason. What Wesley N. Hohfeld and Albert Kocourek term jural relations in their 
respective treatises on legal relationships 4 are examples of concepts which are 
’irreducible’ in this sense. While jural relations, in any given instance may be argued 
to be dependent upon legal norms as an aspect or component of those relations, they 
are not exhaustively reducible to legal norms. This will become apparent when it is 
later suggested that the jural relation is constituted by the conceptual act of 
’associating* one or more legal personae with one or more other legal personae through 
the linking medium of a legal norm upon the occurrence of certain ’operative facts’ 5 
defined by the relevant legal norm. This conceptual act cannot be reduced to only one 
of its conceptual components: the legal norm.
It is in the conceptual act of linking legal personae by reference to a legal norm that 
the jural relation inheres. Indeed the jural relation may be said to consist of an 
ideative device which is a particular (and peculiar) way of conceiving of the relative 
legal positions of legal personae with respect to one another for legal purposes.
For reasons that will later become clear, it is proposed to attempt in this thesis a 
Weberian sociological analysis of the jural relation. One reason for the choice of the 
jural relation has already been mentioned: the relationality of human social action as 
something of sociological significance. Another reason is suggested after a moment’s
3reflection on the dependence of legal reasoning on, and pervasiveness within legal 
thought of, legal concepts such as, for example, right, duty, power, immunity, and so 
on, and jural relations such as the right-duty or power-liability relationships. As 
Kocourek points out,
"Legal ideas are necessary in any system of law. It is not possible to have an 
idea of law acting upon social phenomena without a fulcrum of intermediate 
concepts. The chief way in which legal advantages are distributed is through a 
system of claims and powers. It is inconceivable that a system of law can exist 
and function without this intervening mechanical principle." 6
The sociology of the German social theorist Max Weber is considered particularly 
appropriate for the purpose of an analysis of the jural relation partly because Weber’s 
general sociology gives an important place to the ideative component of human action, 
and partly also because Weber, with his legal background, was particularly aware of 
the unique qualities of legal phenomena, and indeed directed a substantial part of his 
scholarly efforts towards the explanation of such phenomena. It is fitting, therefore, 
to begin with a consideration of Weber as sociologist and jurist.
1.2 Max Weber as Social and Legal Theorist
Max Weber (1864-1920) has throughout the course of the twentieth century been 
regarded as an important and influential social theorist and it is conceivable that he is 
now widely recognised as perhaps the greatest social theorist of modern times. Weber 
is indeed arguably unrivalled as a theoretician in the epistemology and methodology of 
the social sciences.
Although Weber died nearly seventy years ago, the pervasiveness of his writings is
4undiminished within those fields of knowledge to which he directed his undoubtedly 
immense erudition: social and political theory, history, comparative religion, 
economics, art, literature, the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences, and 
the sociology of law. According to Alan Hunt, "Weber’s presence insinuates itself into 
nearly every important debate and controversy within sociology".7 In the first part of 
his unfinished masterpiece Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economy and Society) which 
was published posthumously Weber attempted, among other things, to develop a 
systematic exposition of sociological concepts and methodological principles. It is 
towards this part of his work in particular that considerable scholarly attention is 
directed within contemporary social theory.8 For present purposes, Weber’s position as 
a jurist, and in particular as a sociologist of law, is also of concern.
Weber was himself trained as a lawyer and studied law at the University of 
Heidelberg, later establishing himself in Berlin as a jurist in 1891 following the 
publication of a paper on Roman agrarian history. That part of Weber’s Economy and 
Society which constitutes his Sociology o f Law (Rechtssoziologie) 9 is perhaps a 
testament to his extensive historical and comparative legal learning. But Weber’s 
Sociology of Law is a difficult work for sociologists and lawyers alike. Guenther Roth 
has observed that "[Weber’s] ability to write the Sociology of Law as a legal historian 
makes this the most difficult chapter for the legal layman and mere [sic] 
sociologist..."10 Furthermore, this difficulty, for sociologists and lawyers, of usefully 
applying Weberian sociological analysis towards the solution of problems encountered 
within both social and legal theory lies in that not only is the Sociology o f Law (as 
part of Economy and Society) incomplete, but it is integrally related to, and forms an 
important constituent of, Weber’s general sociology. On the one hand, the 
incompleteness of the Sociology o f Law has led Anthony T. Kronman to remark:
5"[The Rechtssoziologie]...is a great, rough-hewn mass of thoughts which, 
although often suggestive, do not together form a recognizable whole - which do 
not, in other words, constitute a work. The entire Weberian corpus resembles a 
stone quarry filled with monumental statues in varying degrees of completion, 
some only beginning to emerge from the rock, others finished to perfection. 
The Rechtssoziologie is one of the least finished works in the quarry, and the 
temptation is strong to treat it as a rich but disorderly storehouse whose contents 
may be plundered at will without fear of damaging its organizational 
structure."11
Perhaps one of the clearest examples of incompleteness is to be found in chapter XII 
of the Sociology o f Law (Domination) which seems to end mid-chapter in the course 
of what is likely to be an important discussion of the correspondence between certain 
’pure’ types of domination and types of legitimation.12
On the other hand, the inseparability of Weber’s sociology of law from his general 
sociology is affirmed both by Kronman13 and Hunt,14 the latter of whom points 
indirectly (and doubtless with some apprehension) to the ponderous ubiquity of 
Weber’s interpretive sociology, when he refers to the "impediment of the theoretical 
framework of [Weber’s] subjectivist sociology", within which "the most central and 
pressing problems for the sociology of law" are located.15 It would be of no practical 
utility to attempt to simplify or to summarise here Weber’s Sociology o f Law, firstly 
because the breadth and complexity of treatment of Weber’s concerns (and indeed the 
density of his writing) are such as to be immune either to simplification or 
condensation, and secondly because our present concern to attempt a sociological 
analysis of the jural relation is relatively narrow and it therefore seems unnecessary to 
confront in its awesome totality the sprawling edifice of Weberian sociology of law. 
At any rate, it is Weber’s general sociology which will be applied towards the analysis 
of the jural relation, rather than, specifically, Weber’s sociology of law, although the 
latter constitutes a particularly valuable reference source in applying (and formulating
6a technique for applying) Weber’s general sociology. But we should nevertheless be 
aware of the breadth of Weber’s concerns in his Sociology o f Law and shall give brief 
consideration to this now.
Thus, for example, he constructs an ideal typology of legal systems which is based on 
a classification of types of legal thought formal rationality, formal irrationality, 
substantive rationality and substantive irrationality. 16 He manifests a particular 
concern with the concept of rationality in legal thinking and devotes attention to the 
unique type of legal rationality which has evolved in Western culture, characterised in 
its most advanced stage of methodological and logical rationality by five postulates, 
derived, according to Weber, from the Pandectists’ Civil Law. 17 He classifies fields 
of substantive law according to traditionally held distinctions found in legal theory: for 
example, public law and private law, 18 ’government’ and ’administration’, 19 criminal 
law and private law, 20 and tort and crime 21. He considers the emergence of legal 
norms within human society and the development and imposition ’from above* of new 
legal norms. 22 He devotes a substantial chapter to the various social and economic 
conditions which lead to the creation of legal rights, 23 and he also undertakes a 
comparative study of legal professionals (’legal honoratiores’ 24) and attempts to 
establish linkages between professional legal training and the emergence of types of 
legal thought. Finally (according to this overview only) he considers the embeddedness 
in legal processes of ’superiority* or ’legitimate authority’ (which Weber’s translators 
have termed ’domination*, being a translation from the German ’HerrschafC 25), and 
he discusses the manifestations of such power in ordinary legal relationships. 26
For all the breadth of his concerns in the Sociology o f Law> Weber curiously does not 
attempt explicitly to apply his general sociology (for example, the method of
7interpretive understanding or *Verstehen’ or of causal explanation) to the sociological 
analysis of legal phenomena, although, as the passage quoted above from Alan Hunt 
affirms, the influence of Weber’s thinking generally and of his sociology are apparent 
throughout the work. Very often Weber simply takes for granted that the assumptions 
he has made will be obvious to the reader, and indeed probably regards many of his 
assumptions (possibly even the most obscure ones) as being too obvious to state at 
length. Indeed, Weber might have considered an explicit application of his 
methodology towards the explanation of legal phenomena to have lacked subtlety (if he 
even considered it at all), especially as the Sociology o f Law is actually part of 
Economy and Society.
In the next chapter we will consider at some length Weber’s general sociology but this 
will be preceded by a brief consideration of the object of our study seen in the 
context of Weber’s general sociology. This will be useful in showing the major points 
of contact between Weber’s sociology and the essentially jurisprudential discussion of 
jural relations. It will also, it is hoped, reveal Weber’s sociology as a framework 
within which the analysis to follow is located.
1.3 Object of Thesis
As we have indicated, our object in attempting a Weberian sociological analysis of the 
jural relation is in broad terms to explore the sense in which relationality in human 
social behaviour is manifested in the concepts and conceptions which are ordinarily 
employed in legal thinking. To this end, a fundamental assumption which underlies 
our study is that analytical jurisprudence and sociology of law lend themselves readily
8to syncretism. This possibility is examined briefly in chapter V. But although Weber’s 
general sociology will provide a conceptual framework within which the central 
arguments unfold, it will become clear that the Hohfeldian approach to the analysis of 
legal phenomena may actually broaden our understanding of human social behaviour 
in general. Certainly, a sharpened appreciation of the relationality of social behaviour 
may be one consequence of the Hohfeldian perspective.
The brief expository presentation of Weber’s science of social action in chapter II, 
then, will be the point of departure for our analysis. From an elementary outline of 
the philosophical influences which inform Weber’s general sociology, we will consider 
in turn the principal components of Weber’s scientific system, culminating in an 
examination of the analytical construct of the ideal type which in many ways 
represents the focal point of Weber’s sociology. Indeed, the ideal type will play a 
fundamental role in this study. In chapter VI we will attempt to formulate an 
ideal-type construct representing the perspective of an ultimate judicial actor.
It will be argued that the conceptual apparatus of the jural relation is embedded in the 
subjective meaning of judicial social action. The causal significance of judicial action, 
as we will consider, resides in the function of a judiciary as an agency through which 
the coercive enforcement machinery of the state is mobilised to take official action. 
Since, as we shall consider, the jural relation is figuratively regarded as an ’emanation’ 
from an hierarchically ultimate judicial perspective, it seems appropriate to construct 
an ideal-typical judge who, according to our hypothesis, epitomises such a perspective. 
In this context, ’ultimate’ will be taken to mean conclusive and final for purposes of 
the legal system in which our hypothetical judge is situated. For convenience, the 
ideal-typical incumbent of the ultimate judicial office will be called ’Iudex*.
9As a basis for our inquiry into the nature of human social action generally, and 
judicial social action in particular, we will examine in chapter III the normative 
component of human action. This will involve, in particular, a consideration of the 
sense in which the social norm becomes incorporated into the subjective meaning of 
social action, functioning not only as a reference point for the evaluation and 
orientation of the individual’s social action, and as a reference point for the evaluation 
by the individual of the action of others, but also as a means of regulating human 
action. The normative dimension of subjective meaning will be termed ’normative 
meaning’.
In order to fix ideas in relation to the normativity of action, there is postulated at the 
beginning of chapter III a speculative scheme which attempts to illustrate the process 
by which human action becomes subject to governance by norms, or becomes 
’normatised’.
In our introductory remarks to this chapter we briefly mentioned the American 
sociologist Talcott Parsons. In chapter III we will rely upon Parsons* definition of a 
stable system of interaction as a basis for discussion of the normative component of 
human action, particularly the expectational and obligational components. As we shall 
find, these components form the theoretical foundation of the right-duty relationship. 
The essential features of a stable system of interaction, according to Parsons, are 
exhibited in the activity of playing a game such as chess. This useful paradigm will 
therefore appear at various points throughout chapter III as a model for the analysis of 
the major components of social action.
10
In the concluding parts of chapter III we will consider the phenomenon of relationality 
as an aspect of the subjective meaning of social action. We will explore the sense in 
which this phenomenon is manifested in the structure of the social norm, and to that 
end an attempt will be made to postulate structural elements of the social norm. This 
will be considered a first step towards the elucidation of the normative relationship, a 
specific manifestation of which, as we will find, is the jural relation. Chapter III will 
conclude with a consideration of the distinction between substantive and adjective 
normative relationality. This distinction will be examined in the context of the chess 
game paradigm in which an imaginary umpire assumes an adjudicatory function. The 
importance of this distinction will hopefully emerge from the discussion of the jural 
relation in chapter V.
In chapter IV we will attempt a transition from the sociological notion of normative 
meaning to the jurisprudential notion of legal meaning. Our starting point will be an 
examination of the divergence between subjectively intended meaning and legal 
meaning. It will be argued that in order to understand the meaning ascribed to human 
action, events or legally relevant ’facts* for purposes of the mobilisation of a legal 
’coercive apparatus’, it is essential to adopt a perspective such as that of Index. The 
reason for this has already been suggested. An actor such as ludex , to a culturally 
significant degree, is ex hypothesi involved in this ’mobilising* task and this obviously 
has causal significance.
In chapter IV we will also consider the ascriptive nature of jural relations and the 
ascriptive nature of the process by which legal meaning is attached to legally relevant 
’facts’. ’Facts* of this kind will be termed ’institutional facts’, following Neil 
MacCormick’s institutional theory of law. We will also examine, in chapter IV,
11
various categories of ’institutional fact’, and, finally, consider the process of 
’crystallisation’ of a jural relation upon the occurrence of Hohfeldian ’operative facts*.
Having sketched, in earlier chapters, an outline of the theoretical structure of the jural 
relation, in chapter V we will examine the fundamental juridical elements of the jural 
relation and also consider the jural relation, firstly as social relationship, and secondly 
as a relationship of social power.
As our point of departure, we will suggest a definition of the jural relation. Our 
reliance on the ideal type Index as a theoretical perspective for our study will 
necessitate our approaching chapters V and VI, as it were, ’in parallel*.
A brief presentation of the historical development of the conceptual apparatus of the 
jural relation will serve as a foundation for our examination of the jural relation as 
expounded by Hohfeld and Kocourek, and their respective commentators. Chapter V 
will conclude with an analysis of the nature and structure of the Hohfeldian legal 
power. This will involve not only differentiating the legal power from the legal right 
stricto sensu, but also indicating the main points of convergence between the two 
generic concepts.
As we have already indicated, in chapter VI we will outline the major structural 
elements of a Weberian ideal-type construct, that of the incumbent of the ultimate 
judicial office, or Iudex. In our discussion of Iudex we will seek to outline a 
theoretical perspective from which the process by which jural relations come to be 
ascribed may be ’visualised’. This outline will serve to identify the defining features 
of an ultimate judicial office and to demonstrate how these features have a role in
12
shaping and delimiting the conceptual apparatus of the jural relation. Briefly, we will 
consider in turn the concept of the ’office*, the process of adjudication, and the notion 
of ultimacy.
In more general terms, if there is an overriding ’message’ in this study it is that by 
perceiving legal phenomena in terms of legal relationships rather than in terms of legal 
norms we may attain at least a rudimentary insight into the essentially social nature of 
legal phenomena and this in a sense may ’liberate’ us from the constraints of purely 
juridical conceptions of law and legal relationships rooted in the conceptual categories 
of traditional legal thought. Thus, the conceptual unit of the legal relationship, and
more specifically of the jural relation, will be treated as the primary unit of social
thinking or sociological theorising about the law.
With these brief introductory remarks in mind, and by way of transition to the
discussion of Weber’s sociology, it may be useful, in order to gain an initial impression 
of what Weber conceived the object of sociology to be, to ’meditate’ upon Weber’s 
definitions of sociology and of the concept of social action. In chapter II we will give 
fuller consideration to these definitions, but at this stage it is necessary only to 
familiarise ourselves with them. At this point, therefore, no comments will be offered 
upon the definitions.
Weber’s famous definition of sociology (incorporating a definition of the concept of 
social action) makes its appearance at an early stage in Part I of Economy and Society 
and is followed by a lengthy elaboration consisting of numbered observations. The 
complete definition is reproduced below and is of particular use in showing how the 
constituent parts of Weber’s sociology impact upon one another.
13
"Sociology (in the sense in which this highly ambiguous word is used here) is a 
science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order 
thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects. In ’action’ is 
included all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual 
attaches a subjective meaning to it. Action in this sense may be either overt or 
purely inward or subjective; it may consist of positive intervention in a situation 
or deliberately refraining from such intervention or passively acquiescing in the 
situation. Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning 
attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the 
behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course".27
Weber takes his definition of the concept of social action further, stressing its 
meaningful content.
"Social action, which includes failure to act and passive acquiescence, may be 
oriented to the past, present or expected future behaviour of others...The ’others’ 
may be individual persons, and may be known to the actor as such, or may 
constitute an indefinite plurality and may be entirely unknown as 
individuals....Not every type of contact of human beings has a social character; 
this is rather confined to cases where the actor’s behaviour is meaningfully 
oriented to that of others."28
These definitions, then, are a foundation for the discussion of Weber in the next 
chapter where, as previously indicated, our concern is to outline the major features of 
Weber’s sociology both in terms of its epistemological basis and methodological focus.
II
MAX W EBER’S  SCIENCE OF SOCIAL ACTION
II. 1 Philosophical Influences
The famous Kantian distinction between the phenomenal world, or the world of 
external objects or events which we know by sensory perception, and the noumenal 
world, which is the intelligible world of objects of experience not given by the senses 
but conceived in the mind, formed the philosophical basis of two strands of late 
nineteenth century German philosophy, exponents of which (all of them 
contemporaries of Weber) influenced Weber in the formulation of his science of social 
action. The philosopher and historian Wilhelm Dilthey (1833 - 1911), continuing the 
German Idealist tradition, and philosophers Heinrich Rickert (1863 - 1936) and 
Wilhelm Windelband (1848 - 1915), both representatives of the Southwest German 
school of Neo-Kantianism, significantly influenced Weber’s epistemological and 
methodological writings. Yet, characteristically, Weber adopted positions which were 
at points wholly at variance with, yet elsewhere largely in accordance with, their 
teachings.
Dilthey based his approach on the recognition that the subject matter of the mental 
sciences (Geistesmssenschaften) as he called them, differs from the subject matter of 
the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften). The natural sciences basically deal with the 
investigation of the properties and structure of matter (including living matter in the 
biological sense) and energy, and with changes which these phenomena undergo, in 
accordance with ’laws’ defining these properties derived from such investigation.
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Mental sciences, on the other hand, according to Dilthey, were concerned with the 
study of ’mankind’. Human beings ascribe meaning to their actions. They strive 
towards goals, they interpret the actions of others, they evaluate their own and others’ 
actions, and they adhere to social norms. Knowledge of this, Dilthey maintained, was 
possible only through experience (Erleben) and understanding (Verstehen), and this 
could be achieved through a process of re-experiencing or re-living (Nacherleben) the 
meanings intended by historical actors. Thus, experience is to be understood from 
within, while the world of physical matter is conceived from without. The study of 
human action therefore had to recognise the sense in which the inner nature of the 
individual, the world of the mind, affects his actions:
"Only in the world of the mind which creatively, responsibly and autonomously,
stirs within us, has life its value, its goal and its meaning."1
The critical element of Dilthey’s distinction between natural sciences and mental 
sciences lay in the assertion that the methods of the natural sciences were both 
inadequate and inappropriate to the task of acquiring knowledge about human beings 
and human action, because in the natural sciences knowledge is based on the 
observation, categorisation and quantification of externally observable phenomena, 
whereas the knowledge or understanding of human individuals and their action must 
proceed from an intuitive grasp of internal phenomena, represented as man’s inner 
experience. Dilthey therefore considered it both legitimate and justified for science to 
consider the world of the mind in order to reach an understanding of mankind. The 
world of the mind is first of all determined by the world of experience, and it 
becomes legitimate to make ’objects’ of the mind the subject of judgments and 
theoretical discussion, since these are all part of the reality of human experience. As 
Dilthey observed:
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"What comes first are experiences. As I have tried to prove earlier, these occur 
in a context which, in the midst of change remains the same throughout life. 
On the basis of this context, what I have earlier called the acquired structure of 
mental life develops. It includes our ideas, valuations and purposes and exists as 
a link between them....This structure constantly affects our actions, colouring 
our ideas and states, organizing our impressions and regulating our emotions....I 
see no objection to our abstracting this structure of experience from the pattern 
of a man’s life, calling it the mental and making it the subject of judgments and 
theoretical discussions."2
The investigator who wished to reach an understanding of the meanings intended by 
an actor could approach the problem of bridging the gap between his own intuitive 
experience and that of the actor under investigation by entering into a type of 
empathic liaison with the actor in question, through careful introspection and a 
’projection’ of himself into the ’expressions’ of the actor. In Dilthey’s view, 
’expressions’ were any manifestation of mental content8 and could consist, generally, of 
actions of any type, or particularly, of facial expressions, gestures, movements and 
exclamations, or words and sentences.4 The process of empathising, re-living or 
re-experiencing which leads to ’higher understanding’ of a given actor as a 
methodological approach would depend to a large extent on the experiences which the 
investigator had himself undergone, and the more his experiences had corresponded, 
even if only approximately, with those of the subject of his investigation, the more 
enlightened would be his understanding.
"The approach of higher understanding to its object is determined by its task of 
discovering a vital connection in what is given. This is only possible if the 
context which exists in one’s own experience and has been encountered in 
innumerable cases is always - and with all the potentialities contained in it - 
present and ready. This state of mind involved in the task of understanding we 
call empathy, be it with a man or a work.... If, therefore, understanding 
requires the presence of one’s own mental experience this can be described as a 
projection of the self into some given expression."5
While Weber was greatly influenced by, and accepted, much of Dilthey’s teaching, 
especially Dilthey’s espousal of the method of Verstehen or interpretive understanding, 
and the processes of empathising and re-living, he nevertheless in his own
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methodology adopted a position which opposed Dilthey’s rejection of the possibility of 
positivistic methods (i.e. those appropriate in the natural sciences) being applied in 
the study of human behaviour. The observation of regular relations between external 
events and uniformities and the drawing of appropriate inferences from these, in 
Weber’s view, had to be taken hand in hand with the attribution to actors of 
subjective meanings and the interpretive understanding of action which emerged from 
that process. As Lewis A. Coser says,
"The grasping of subjective meaning of an activity, Weber argued, is facilitated 
through empathy (Einfuehlung) and a reliving (Nacherleben) of the experience to 
be analyzed. But any interpretative explanation (verstehende Erklaerung) must 
become a causal explanation if it is to reach the dignity of a scientific 
proposition. Verstehen and causal explanation are correlative rather than 
opposed principles of method in the social sciences. Immediate intuitions of 
meaning can be transformed into valid knowledge only if they can be 
incorporated into theoretical structures that aim at causal explanation.1
The German philosophers Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband also exerted a 
powerful influence on Weber, but differed from Dilthey in locating the distinction 
between methods appropriate to the study of human behaviour and those appropriate 
to the study of natural phenomena, not in necessities arising from differences of 
subject matter, but in terms of method or approach to that subject matter. They held, 
as Weber did, that human behaviour could in appropriate cases be studied by the 
methods of natural science, just as, in other cases, the so-called cultural sciences or 
Kulturwissenschaften approach was more appropriate, although it will be recalled that 
Weber’s radical approach demanded a ’coalescence’ of both approaches. The 
distinction to be drawn between Kulturwissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften lay in 
the fact that in the former (for example, history, jurisprudence, sociology), so-called 
idiographic sciences, the approach is to particularise or individualise the subject 
matter, concentrating on the uniqueness of historical actors or events. In the latter
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(for example, chemistry, biology, physics), so-called nomothetic sciences, the approach 
is to abstract and generalise and to evolve universal laws capable of subsuming all 
particular manifestations of phenomena within their ambit.
In opposition to the Neo-Kantians, Weber argued that scientific methodology, 
proceeding by way of generalisation and abstraction, could be as appropriate in the 
context of cultural sciences as it was in the context of natural sciences. The
formulation of sociological concepts (such as the ideal type) would proceed from an
observation of the concrete action of particular actors, but would then seek to 
generalise and to establish relationships which would transcend the particularity of 
subjective meanings and individual courses of action present in given observed
instances. This point is clearly stated by Coser:
"The natural scientist is primarily interested in those aspects of natural events 
that can be formulated in terms of abstract laws. While the social scientist may 
wish to search for such lawful abstract generalizations in human behavior, he is 
also interested in particular qualities of human actors and in the meaning they 
ascribe to their actions. Any scientific method must make a selection from the 
infinite variety of empirical reality. When the social scientist adopts a 
generalizing method, he abstracts from random and unique aspects of the reality 
he considers; concrete individual actions are conceived as ’cases’ or ’instances’, 
which are subsumed under theoretical generalizations. The individualizing 
approach, in contrast, neglects generic elements and concentrates attention on 
particular features of phenomena or concrete historical actors."7
Rickert’s influence on Weber’s thought centred less on the debate which the latter 
conducted in reference to the ’true’ distinction between natural and cultural sciences 
lying in their status as nomothetic and idiographic disciplines respectively, than on 
Rickert’s doctrine of value-relevance (Wertbeziehung). Rickert asserted that empirical 
reality as presented to the senses is both infinite and inexhaustible in space and in 
time. As H.H. Bruun says "...the number of possible objects of our perception is 
infinitely great, and any such object may furthermore be divided into an infinite
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number of lesser objects, each of them different from all the others at least by its 
place in space and time".8
It was necessary, according to Rickert, for the historian to make a choice or selection 
from the boundlessness of reality in terms of values which guided that selection, 
according to a criterion of significance. What made a particular object of cognition 
significant was the relationship in which it stood to objective or universally 
acknowledged cultural values. Thus, according to Bruun,9 the value relation would 
permit a selection from the infinite multiplicity of reality only if the values entering 
into the value relation were universally acknowledged cultural values.
Against Rickert, Weber took the view that the values which governed the choice of 
phenomena of interest, and the selection and abstraction from infinite reality were not 
universally acknowledged cultural values, but those of the investigator himself, 
influenced by the type of problems under investigation, the particular nature of the 
subject matter, and the questions which required to be answered. These matters could 
never readily be contained within objective cultural values, and depended very much 
on the investigator’s own calculations of significance. According to Coser, "There are 
no intrinsically scientific criteria for the selection of topics; here every man must 
follow his own demon, his own moral stance, but this in no way invalidates the 
objectivity of the social sciences."10 Talcott Parsons put the matter this way:
"Once a phenomenon is descriptively given, the establishment of causal relations 
between it and either its antecedents or its consequences is possible only through 
the application, explicitly or implicitly, of a formal schema of proof that is 
independent of any value system, except the value of scientific proof."11
The notion of value-relevance in the sense discussed must, however, be distinguished 
from Weber’s postulate of value-freedom. What this means is that once the
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investigator has selected an area of concern as his object of inquiry he must not allow 
his own personal preferences or prejudices, or political or religious beliefs, to colour 
his judgment or contaminate any of the conclusions he reaches with respect to the 
subject matter of his investigation. This may be a difficult task, but the more the 
social scientist approximates to a position of value-neutrality or value freedom, in 
Weber’s view, the more scientifically ’true’ or objective will be the results of his 
investigation. Scientific objectivity demands that the investigator should reach out 
beyond his own personal values and present a view which is neutral with respect to 
those values.12
While accepting Rickert’s view of the boundlessness of reality and the need for 
selection and choice in scientific investigation, Weber opposed Rickert’s insistence on 
the particularising approach of Kulturwissenschaften by adopting a position in which a 
generalising approach could be combined with the processes of selection and 
abstraction contained within the notion of value-relevance. It becomes appropriate, 
then, for the scientist to construct sociological concepts. Rickert’s influence is again 
noted by Bruun.
"Just like Rickert, Weber concludes from the view of reality as boundless that a 
scientific reproduction of the whole of reality is a practical, indeed a logical, 
impossibility. This again entails that all scientific disciplines must, consciously 
or unconsciously, make use of concepts, and that such concepts can only 
embrace parts of reality."13
The pre-eminent sociological concept in Weber’s methodology is, of course, the ideal 
type. According to Weber an ideal type is formed "...by the one-sided accentuation of 
one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, 
more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are
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arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified 
analytical construct."14 What is included in the ideal-type construct depends on the 
investigator’s judgments of significance, and again, on the problems, questions and 
specialties necessitated, on the one hand, by the subject matter, and on the other hand, 
by the investigator’s particular objectives.
This concludes our brief survey of the philosophical influences which inform Weber’s 
interpretive sociology. Hopefully it should serve as a backdrop against which, in the 
remainder of this chapter, the particular features of Weber’s sociology and their 
implications in the context of this study may be considered in greater detail.
II.2 Subjective Meaning
As we have considered, for Weber sociology attempts the interpretive understanding of 
social action and the causal explanation of its course and effects. In this context, 
’action’ includes all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual 
attaches a subjective meaning (Sinn) to it.15 As we have found, Weber, in accordance 
with German Geisteswissenschaften, held that human action was understandable only if 
the subjective beliefs, volitions, intentions and motives of the acting individual were 
in some way penetrated by the investigator.
The subjective meaning of action therefore stands in a relationship to the complex of 
motivating ideas which impel the actor to act in a particular way. As Dilthey 
observed, "There is a regular relation between an action and some mental content 
which allows us to make probable inferences."16 In a general sense, an actor might be
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said to orient his action consciously or purposively towards the attainment of a certain 
end subjectively represented in advance of its attainment by an idea in the actor’s 
mind. This is perhaps most clearly manifested in goal-oriented or purposive action. 
The presupposition of the meaningfulness of purposive action is also made by Roberto 
Unger when he says,
"The intelligibility of human conduct presupposes that action can be understood 
by reference to ideas about the ends an individual pursues and about the 
conditions that serve or impede the attainment of those ends. A person’s 
conduct is comprehensible in specifically human or social terms only when we 
are able to see why he acted in a certain way at a certain moment, given his 
beliefs about the purposes he wished to achieve and about the circumstances in 
which he had to act."17
Since Weberian sociology is concerned with (social) action only when and in so far as 
the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it, it follows that if an 
individual attaches no subjective meaning to his action (e.g. reflex action) it is not 
’action’ within the meaning of Weber’s definition, and is not susceptible of sociological 
interpretive understanding.
But action may be partially explicable by reference to a particular subjective meaning 
correctly identified by the investigator as a motive for action. For example, if an 
actor orients his action by reference to a social norm we may conclude that part of the 
subjective meaning of that action is the social norm in question, although certainly the 
action may not be accounted meaningful exhaustively by reference to the social norm.
Weber distinguishes two main categories of subjective meaning: (1) the actual existing 
meaning in the given concrete case of a particular actor, or the average or approximate 
meaning attributable to a given plurality of actors, and (2) the theoretically conceived 
pure type of subjective meaning attributed to the hypothetical actor or actors in a
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given type of action.18
The first category of meaning involves the actual meaning which an investigator might 
attribute to action in a concrete situation. Such a situation may not be restricted to 
the investigation of one individual at a time, because several individuals (’a given 
plurality of actors’) may be involved in a similar course of action and may, to an 
extent, share the same goals or purposes. But since a plurality of actors cannot 
possibly share identical subjective meanings, the meaning which the investigator 
attributes must therefore be, as Weber puts it, "average or approximate".
The second category of meaning, which is the pure or ideal type of meaning attributed 
to an hypothetical actor, is a theoretical abstraction and might appropriately be found 
in an ideal-type construct. Since it is ’ideal’ it need not (and in many, if not all, cases 
probably will not) correspond to the subjective meaning present in a concrete case of a 
particular actor. Being theoretical, it may involve generality and synthesis from "a 
great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete 
individual phenomena".19 The second category of meaning may depend on the 
attribution of meanings of the first category in so far as ’synthesis* is attempted of 
concrete individual phenomena. The ideal type of meaning probably cannot take 
account of personality traits of given actors, such as idiosyncrasies or eccentricities. 
The theoretical abstraction is nomothetic in the sense that it seeks to give an account 
of common features present in a type of action across a generality of similar yet 
individual cases. Hence the ideal type of Weberian bureaucrat may approach the 
Kafkaesque image of the bureaucrat, while in a given case an actual bureaucrat may 
show sensitivity and concern for the needs of those who transact with him.
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Weber emphasises that ’meaning* does not refer to an objectively ’correct* meaning or 
one which is ’true’ in some metaphysical sense.20 In Weber’s view, there is no true or 
valid meaning, but only one which seems appropriate in the light of the data with 
which the investigator is working. But on the other hand scientific objectivity 
demands that the meaning ascribed by the investigator should be at least consistent 
with all the evidence presented to the investigator and from which he might draw any 
necessary inferences. But a pure or ideal type of meaning will probably never 
correspond exactly with a concrete empirical instance. Nevertheless, as Weber insists: 
"All interpretation of meaning, like all scientific observation, strives for clarity and 
verifiable accuracy of insight and comprehension”.21
According to Weber, subjective meaning is most clearly grasped when action is 
oriented purposively to a certain end. This type of action Weber calls rationally 
oriented action or purpose-rational (zweckrational) action.22 In action of this type, the 
actor tries to achieve certain ends by making a conscious choice of appropriate means 
to the end. By considering alternative means and weighing these up in relation to the 
end, the actor may act with a degree of intentionality which transcends that of other 
types of action, such as, for example, action which is traditionally oriented.23 For the 
investigator "Such an interpretation of this type of rationally purposeful action 
possesses, for the understanding of the choice of means, the highest degree of 
verifiable certainty."24 Because rational action involves the actor in consciously 
weighing up means and ends, subjective meaning is more likely to be accessible to the 
investigator precisely because the actor himself is aware of his reasons for acting. But 
even then, as Weber concedes, the actor may not be fully conscious of his intended 
meaning. This may indeed cast doubt on the utility of Weber’s whole explanatory 
scheme. As Weber says,
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"In the great majority of cases actual action goes on in a state of inarticulate 
half-consciousness or actual unconsciousness of its subjective meaning. The 
actor is more likely to ’be aware* of it in a vague sense than he is to ’know* 
what he is doing or be explicitly self-conscious about it. ... The ideal type of 
meaningful action where the meaning is fully conscious and explicit is a 
marginal case."25
Despite this apparent methodological impediment, Weber favours the construction of 
rational ideal types which, when compared with an actual course of action, allow the 
identification of irrational elements as "factors of deviation from a conceptually pure 
type of rational action."26 The end result, then is a rational ideal type:
"The construction of a purely rational course of action in such cases serves the 
sociologist as a type (’ideal type’) which has the merit of clear understandability 
and lack of ambiguity. By comparison with this it is possible to understand the 
ways in which actual action is influenced by irrational factors of all sorts, such 
as affects and errors, in that they account for the deviation from the line of 
conduct which would be expected on the hypothesis that the action were purely 
rational."27
Weber stresses that sociology is not solely concerned with rational action nor is it 
afflicted with a ’rationalistic bias’. The rational ideal type is purely a "methodological 
device".28 It should also be noted that the ideal type states what course a given type of 
human action would take i f  it were strictly rational, unaffected by errors or emotional 
factors,29 and in this sense involves hypothesis which conceivably, on the one hand, 
may eliminate the irrational, while on the other hand, exaggerate (if not ’fabricate’) 
the rational.
According to J.W.N. Watkins, the purpose of the ideal type is as an heuristic aid 
which tells nothing about the real world, but which throws into relief the real world’s 
deviations from the type. Hence the ideal type should assist in the detection of 
disturbing factors, such as habit and tradition, which "deflect actual individuals from a 
rational course of action."
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Watkins likens this process to improving one’s appreciation of the shape of a roughly 
circular object "by placing over it an accurate tracing of a circle."30
The process of determining or ascribing subjective meaning also requires the 
investigator to place any meaning in "a more inclusive context of meaning" 
(Sinnzusammenhang).81 Weber illustrates the point by imagining the example of a 
person writing down the proposition twice two equals four: "Understanding in this 
sense is attained if we know that he is engaged in balancing a ledger or in making a 
scientific demonstration, or is engaged in some other task of which this particular act 
would be an appropriate part."32 Given the complexity of human motivation, this 
could, at least in theory, involve the investigator in an ever-widening spiral of actual 
or possible subjective meanings. But Weber would surely counter this objection by 
arguing that the investigator need go no further than his specific investigatorial 
objectives require. But even so, he provides a further criterion in terms of which 
subjective meaning is presumed to be ’adequate’. He defines the term ’motive’ (which 
would ordinarily infer at least an overriding, if not conclusive, reason for acting) as "a 
complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an 
adequate ground for the conduct in question."33 He then postulates a criterion of 
adequacy:
"We apply the term ’adequacy on the level of meaning \sinnhafte Adaequanz) to 
the subjective interpretation of a coherent course of conduct when and in so far 
as, according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling, its component parts 
taken in their mutual relation are recognized to constitute a ’typical’ complex of 
meaning. It is more common to say ’correct’."34
The meaning adequacy of interpretation of a given complex of subjective meaning 
(relative to a given course of conduct) is assessed according to the "habitual modes of
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thought and feeling" of the investigator, by virtue of which meaning is ’adequate* 
when it is judged to be ’typical* or ’correct*.
This entails, firstly, that the investigator’s habitual modes of thought and feeling are 
material to his judgments of adequacy. This suggests that these judgments must be 
made in accordance with the investigator’s (’habitual’) working methodology for 
ascribing meaning to the action of a given actor. Presumably if these judgments are in 
tune with the best working methodology that a particular investigator, in his 
experience, has established, they will be adequate for his own purposes. (He may, of 
course, be a poor investigator). Secondly, the meaning so ascribed should be at least 
’typical’ if not ’correct*. Even if ’correct’ is a near-impossible ideal to achieve in 
practice (given that even the actor himself may be unaware of his own motives), 
’typical* at least suggests that the meaning ascribed should be consistent with, or at any 
rate should not contradict, anything else that is known about the particular actor in 
question, i.e. the meaning should be typical relative to the actor in question.35
Weber links the requirement of meaning adequacy to a requirement of causal 
adequacy, which is the requirement that, "according to established generalizations from 
experience" there should be a probability that a sequence of events "will always 
actually occur in the same way."36 This will be discussed more fully later in this 
chapter, but at this stage we should merely note that in Weber’s view meaning 
adequacy and causal adequacy are both necessary for a correct causal interpretation of 
a concrete and a typical course of action:
"A correct causal interpretation of a concrete course of action is arrived at when 
the overt action and the motives have both been correctly apprehended and at 
the same time their relation has become meaningfully comprehensible. A correct 
causal interpretation of typical action means that the process which is claimed to
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be typical is shown to be both adequately grasped on the level of meaning and 
at the same time the interpretation is to some degree causally adequate."37
Subjective meaning, as we might expect, also includes a normative component. In 
chapter III it will be suggested that human action can often be accounted meaningful 
in terms of the relation which it bears to social norms in their function as a motivating 
influence.
Weber gives many instances in which subjective meaning is accountable to social 
norms and indeed discusses a type of social action which he calls Gesellschaftshandeln 
(rationally regulated or, more accurately, associative action),38 a major component of 
which is meaningful orientation towards rules. Moreover, in the course of his 
discussion of the concept of legitimate order he says: "The subjective meaning of a 
social relationship will be called an ’order’ only if action is approximately or on the 
average oriented to certain determinate ’maxims’ or rules."39 But elsewhere he refers 
more explicitly to the normative component of the subjective meaning of action. 
Thus, in his essay The Concept o f  ’Following a Rule'40 he says:
"[A]...’rule’ of purposive action would have a bearing on empirical knowledge of 
[an actor’s] ...behaviour in two very different senses. First, it might need to be 
considered as an element in [the actor’s]...’maxims’, which form the object of the 
enquiry - that is, as a real determinant of his empirical actions. Secondly, it 
would be taken into account as an element in the stock of knowledge and 
concepts with which the investigator comes to his task: his knowledge of the 
ideally possible ’meaning’ of the action makes it possible for him to have 
empirical knowledge of the action. ...In the empirical sphere, the ’norm* is 
undoubtedly one determinant of the course of events, but from the logical point 
of view it is only one... And there can be a whole range of degrees of 
consciousness of the influence exerted on action by these determinants.
A concomitant of the notion that action may be accounted subjectively meaningful by 
reference to social norms is the possibility that such action may also be accounted 
subjectively meaningful by reference to normative concepts, since, according to our 
opening remarks, social norms do not find their expression only in, nor are they 
conceived solely in terms of, simple imperatives. If, for example, the content of A’s
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’legal right’ in a question with B is identical to B’s ’legal duty’ in a question with A, 
our desire to refer to A’s situation in terms of *A*s legal right’ rather than ’A’s B’s 
legal duty’ (!) is necessary conceptual shorthand.
More significant for present purposes is the possibility that the jural relation is part of 
the conceptual apparatus by which the relative legal positions of legal personae (for 
example, litigants) are conceived. That being so, if such conceptual apparatus is 
incorporated into the subjective meaning of certain sociologically (and causally) 
significant modes of social action such as judicial action, a clearer understanding of 
judicial action and its ’causal effects’ must proceed from a clearer understanding of 
the jural relation itself.
II.3 Social Action
The frame of reference within which Weber theorises about human social behaviour is 
that of social action42. We may recall that according to Weber this neutral frame of 
reference involves, on the one hand, ’action’ which (term) includes "all human 
behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to 
it", and, on the other hand, a social dimension, action being ’social’ "in so far as, by 
virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it..., it takes account of the behaviour of 
others and is thereby oriented in its course."43
According to Weber’s definition, however, action can also be "either overt or purely 
inward or subjective".44 Presumably purely subjective ’action’ in this sense is 
inaccessible to sociological inquiry unless it is in some sense objectivated, for example,
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by ’externally’ perceptible manifestations, or to use Dilthey’s term, ’expressions’.45 
Clearly language is the most obvious and powerful form of ’expression* in this sense, 
consisting of action in its own right: that is, linguistic expressions. The act of giving 
linguistic expression to ideas may, of course, allow access to subjective meanings of 
action other than the act of speech itself.
The contribution of language to mutual understanding among social actors in a context 
of interaction is stressed by Jurgen Habermas, according to his reading of Dilthey, 
when he says:
"But every form of interaction and mutual understanding between individuals is 
mediated by an intersubjectively valid employment of symbols that refer in the 
last instance to ordinary language. Language is the ground of intersubjectivity, 
and every person must already have set foot on it before he can objectivate 
himself in his first expression of life, whether in words, attitudes, or actions. 
Dilthey once wrote of language that ’only in it does man’s interior find its 
complete, exhaustive, and objectively understandable expression.’ Language is 
the medium in which meanings are shared, not only in the cognitive sense but in 
the comprehensive sense of significance that encompasses affective and 
normative modes..."46
The external and internal realities of human action are accessible to sociological 
inquiry, as Weber recognises, because on the one hand action is always an ’external’ 
phenomenon in the sense that it triggers a ’change* in the ’real’ world in the sense 
envisaged, for example, by von Wright. Here, action is seen to ’interfere* with the 
’course of nature’.47 But on the other hand, action arises from within, in the sense that 
ideas motivate action. If therefore it is possible to link the observation of some 
manifested mental content (e.g. an action such as a verbal utterance which reveals an 
intention to act in a particular way) with a subsequent action which is apparently the 
carrying into effect of the intention so expressed, Weber (or Weberians) might perceive 
in this a causal relationship which links the manifested mental content (an ’event’ in 
Weberian terms) with the resultant action (another ’event*). As Weber remarks,
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"Thus causal explanation depends on being able to determine that there is a 
probability, which in the rare ideal case can be numerically stated, but is always 
in some sense calculable, that a given observable event (overt or subjective) will 
be followed or accompanied by another event."48
The essence of social action, then, is that in Weber’s view it is both internal and 
external in the sense discussed, and these elements are in some way ’observable’. In so 
far as action is ’internal’, the method of interpretive understanding or Verstehen is 
brought to bear in the course of the investigative process. This will be discussed more 
fully later in this chapter.
Weber’s definition of social action allows that a given course of action may be treated 
as partly social and partly non-social, depending upon the criterion of subjective 
meaning according to which ’account’ is taken of the ’behaviour’ of others. This flows 
from Weber’s use of the formula "...action is social in so far as..." etc. This limits the 
’social’ component of human action to that part of the subjective meaning of the 
action - i.e. the specifically internal or ideative part - which takes account of, and is
thereby oriented to, the behaviour of others.
The complex of subjective meaning of a course of social action is presumably not 
exhausted in a given case by the taking account of the behaviour of others. The 
action may also be meaningful in terms of, for example, se//-knowledge, or a personal 
feeling of duty, or a motivation which is primarily (but not wholly) se//-interested. It 
is arguable then that the sociological understanding of a course of social action whose
wider context of meaning includes non-social elements may, in certain cases, be
reached only by taking account of the components of social action which are both 
social and non-social.
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Since action, in order to be social action, must take account of the behaviour of 
others, this suggests that all possible human behaviour (i.e. ’behaviour’ in its widest 
sense, including action, inaction, overt or subjective action, purposive or 
non-purposive action, or social or non-social action) must be capable of subsumption 
under this category. The act of taking account of the behaviour of others must 
encompass knowledge (on the part of the actor) of particular behavioural patterns 
which may be exhibited in a given situation, for example, behaviour of others which 
is known to be oriented by reference to social or other norms in a given case. It may 
also include knowledge about human behaviour in general, for example, knowledge of 
human interests, of particular social norms, or of social norms in general.
Weber also draws attention to the important mode of orientation of social action 
towards expectations of certain types. As we shall see in the next chapter, this mode 
of orientation is crucial to our understanding of the concept of legal right. Indeed the 
connection between the expectation mode of orientation and the legal right is explicitly 
noted by Weber. First, in relation to the expectation mode of orientation, Weber 
remarks,
"An important (but not indispensable) component of social action is its
meaningful orientation to the expectation that others will act in a certain way,
and to the presumable chances of success for one’s own action resulting 
therefrom. Action can be understood rather clearly - and this is an important 
type of explanation - when there is an objective chance (i.e., more or less 
probability as expressed in a ’judgment of objective possibility’) that these 
expectations are indeed well-founded. ...In particular, instrumentally rational 
action is oriented toward such expectations."49
In Weber’s sociological definition of ’right’, which will be discussed more fully in
chapter V, the notion of expectation has an important role.
"Sociologically, such legally guaranteed and limited power over the action of
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others corresponds to the expectation that other persons will either engage in, or 
refrain from, certain conduct...without interference from a third party."
In Sociology o f Law, Weber also says,
"We have previously defined the existence of a right as being no more than an 
increase of the probability that a certain expectation of the one to whom the law 
grants the right will not be disappointed."51
It is worth pointing out at this stage, though again this will be given more 
comprehensive treatment later, that in general terms it is immaterial whether a legal 
persona holding a legal right in fact has the mental disposition of expectation as a 
concomitant of his legal right. Under Scots law a child in utero may have legal 
rights62 and it is accepted that insane and indeed comatose persons, are no less capable 
of having legal rights than those who are fully apprised of their legal situation.
Returning to Weber’s more general point that an important component of social action 
is its meaningful orientation to expectations that others will act in a certain way, it 
seems clear that in a course of social action or social interaction, especially one which 
is ’stable* or is likely to be repeated each actor to a greater or lesser extent orients his 
action by reference to his own prediction of the other actor’s probable responsive 
action. (Such a prediction may or may not be well-founded, as Weber observes). 
Indeed it is probable that almost every course of social action involves in some way 
the anticipation by an actor of the likely reaction of other actors to his action. 
Generally speaking, every actor is to some extent concerned to know (so far as 
predictively possible) the implications which his action will have for him in the sense 
that it may well ’act back’ on him.
An actor’s previous knowledge of the stable behaviour of others may furnish him with 
additional grounds for the expectation that a certain course of conduct will occur in 
the future. Furthermore, a sort of ’mirror-imaging’ may also emerge in that an actor 
may orient his action in accordance with what he perceives to be the way another
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actor is likely to expect him (the ’first’ actor) to act.
The expectational component of social action has its origins in the fact that social 
norms and the social environment engender such expectations. Thus, in acting, one 
may expect that others will act in accordance with social, legal or ethical norms, or 
that others will react adversely to one’s action if they judge that action to be in 
violation of such norms. In the legal context, a criminal may act in the knowledge 
that others (e.g. police, civil authorities, judges) will in all probability orient their 
action in response to the recognition of the criminal’s violation of the law. Further 
consideration will be given in chapter III to the expectational component of social 
action (so far as engendered by social norms), referring in particular to the work of 
Parsons. That discussion will also, it is hoped, clarify the notion of obligation.
Weber’s general position that action is social to the extent that it takes account of the 
behaviour of others, and is thereby oriented, seems unduly limiting as to a considerable 
degree social action simply takes account of others (their physical existence, presence, 
or factual proximity, etc.). Thus if someone manoeuvres a car to avoid a pedestrian 
this may not take into account the behaviour or likely future behaviour of the 
pedestrian. Nor may it take into account the ’behaviour* of ’others’ in terms of legal 
or social consequences of colliding with the pedestrian. The driver’s desire to avoid 
harming the pedestrian may simply arise from a personal identification with the 
harmful consequences of injuring him. Even if the act of manoeuvring is instinctive 
(and therefore on the borderline of being subjectively meaningful) it might be argued 
that an instinctive reaction of this type has been conditioned by previous personal 
identification with injured pedestrians in general and that this has simply surfaced at 
the moment of the avoidance act. In any case, Weber appears to recognise that the
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existence, presence or proximity of others (rather than their ’behaviour’) may be what 
is ’taken account o r  in the course of social action, when he remarks,
"Empirically fluid is the transition from the ideal type of a meaningful 
relationship between one’s own action and that of others to the case in which 
another person is merely an object (for example, an infant). For us, behavior 
that is oriented toward meaningful action is only the rational limiting case."53
Elsewhere, Weber observes that overt action is non-social "if it is oriented solely to the 
behaviour of inanimate objects."54 This implies that action is not social in so far as the 
actor takes account of others in their role simply as ’objects’.
Weber also allows within his definition of social action failure to act and passive 
acquiescence.55 Since for Weber "’social action’ ... involves the purposive (sinnhafte) 
orientation of the action of individuals to that of others"56 an unconscious failure to act 
(for example, negligent action or, at least, the purely ’negligent component’ of such 
action) would fall outside Weber’s definition, although a conscious or deliberate 
omission would clearly come within the definition and generally within the idea of 
action which is subjectively meaningful.
Weber’s concept of social action is not the frame of reference within which, in the 
present context, legally relevant human action in general will be considered. It is clear 
that much legally relevant human action is by no means social action within the 
meaning of Weber’s definition. Most of the civil law of negligence, for example, is 
based on the presupposition of unintentional action or inaction being causative of harm 
to others. Even if such action is intentional, the particular consequences of the action 
may be unintended or unforeseen, and in such a case the law may impose a standard 
of reasonable foreseeability which is quite remote from any thought that might have 
passed through the actor’s mind as he acted or failed to act.
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The law may in addition impose liability in tort where the operative state of affairs 
giving rise to the liability is not social action (nor even, more generally, human action) 
but a ’natural event’ which has been imputed to a human act chronologically remote 
from the ’natural event’. Thus in English law liability in tort attaches in certain 
circumstances when a person brings a dangerous thing onto his land and the thing 
escapes and causes damage to neighbouring property.57 In such a case the actual escape 
of the thing might not involve human intervention, but liability is imputed by virtue 
of the act by which the thing was originally introduced to the land.
The law may also assume a particular state of affairs (which may or may not be 
human action, though it may be ultimately capable of imputation to human action) 
against the true state of affairs actually existing, as is the case with certain legal 
fictions. As Pierre J.J. Olivier has said,
"The [legal] fiction consists of a deliberate false assumption of certain facts pro 
veritate. This means that we are ordered by the legal rule to accept untrue facts 
as true and to accept them quite literally, i.e. as if they were the real and 
proven facts, and to act on these facts."58
However, the concept of social action in the present context is useful for several 
reasons. First, as the frame of reference of Weber’s general sociology the working 
concept of social action enables Weber’s sociology to be applied to particular types of 
social action (such as, crucially, judicial action, or the action of litigants). As we 
pointed out in our introductory remarks, we will attempt to incorporate typical 
subjective meanings of judicial social action into an ideal-type construct of the 
incumbent of the ultimate judicial office. In doing this, however, we will also be 
concerned, though only marginally, to understand the social action of litigants, such as 
that of the prosecutor who ’prosecutes’ or of the plaintiff or pursuer who raises a
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court action.
Second, social action forms an important part of the definition of social norm
postulated in chapter III, and as such has a role to play in shaping one of the key
concepts of the thesis.
Third, social action is itself employed by Weber in his delimitation of fundamental
modes of orientation of action. These modes include rationally oriented action
(zweckrational), action which is rationally oriented to an absolute value (wertrational), 
traditionally oriented behaviour, usage {Branch), custom (Sitte), and so on.
Before concluding the present discussion, it is useful to consider, very briefly, the 
main elements of some of these fundamental modes of orientation. For Weber, action 
is rationally oriented to a system of discrete individual ends "...when the end, the 
means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed."59 
According to Weber this involves "...rational consideration of alternative means to the 
end, of the relations of the end to other prospective results of employment of any 
given means, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends."60 Of 
perhaps greater interest, in the present context, is the type of rationally oriented action 
which we encountered in earlier discussion which Weber calls Gesellschaftshandeln. 
This type of action is of particular interest because of its dependence upon rules as a 
reference point for the orientation of action. Weber defines the principal features of 
Gesellschaftshandeln as follows:
"Social action is Gesellschaftshandeln (rationally regulated action) insofar as it is 
(1) meaningfully oriented toward rules which have been (2) established rationally 
with a view toward the expected behavior of the ’associates’ (Vergesellschaftete), 
and insofar as (3) the meaningful orientation is indeed instrumentally rational on
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the part of the actor."61
In an attempt to gain a clearer understanding of this definition, it is convenient to 
consider an example.
Let us assume that a certain social norm requires A to 0 in a question with B under 
circumstances n. In this situation, the act of 0-ing, if  performed in compliance with 
the norm will be social action in the Weberian sense. Thus A, if he consciously 
orients his action by reference to the norm (i.e. 0’s), will either be (i) taking account 
of B in acting (i.e. the existence, proximity or presence of B, and so on), or (ii) 
taking account of the (past) behaviour of B (or expected present or future behaviour 
of B) in so acting, or (iii) taking account, in so acting, of the behaviour or expected 
behaviour of others (apart from B) who may themselves be obligated to take action if 
A should fail to 0. (The ’others* may also express criticism and so on.) We must 
assume that A and B and the ’others* are all the Vergesellschaftete or ’associates’: those 
to whom the social norms apply. In orienting his action by reference to the social 
norm in question, A’s action may indeed involve any combination of (i), (ii) and (iii) 
above.
On this basis, there seem to be at least two ways in which A’s action can be 
considered instrumentally rational in addition to being rule- or norm-governed.
First, the act of 0-ing may itself happen to be the end which A has in sight in acting: 
i.e. it is his goal. In this case end-directed action coincides exactly with normative 
prescription. A wishes to 0; 0-ing is the end A desires to achieve, but also 0-ing is 
prescribed by a norm.
Second, and probably more commonly, the act of 0-ing (which is obligatory according
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to the norm) may be only ancillary to A’s actual goal: it may perhaps constitute part of 
the means to an end. Thus, A may desire to O rather than to 0. If in O-ing, there 
are several possible acts that could be performed (including 0-ing) but that 0-ing (in 
order to O) is actually required, then by 0-ing in order to O A’s action may be both 
instrumentally rational and normatively oriented. Further possibilities can now be 
imagined, for A might wish to achieve a remoter goal: goal X. If the achievement of 
goal X could potentially involve both 0-ing and O-ing, but that (we assume) the latter 
is prohibited, A’s action may be rationally regulated action in Weber’s sense if the 
achievement of goal X is secured by A’s adopting the course of action which is 
non-O-ing, i.e. 0-ing.
Weber’s further qualification that the rules themselves have been ’established 
rationally’ with a view towards expected behaviour, does not seem to make any
difference to the nature of the action of A in the examples given above. It probably
does not matter how the rules have been established. The action arising by virtue of
the rules will still be the same even if (say) the rules have been established
irrationally, for example, if the mode of creation of the rules is completely arbitrary. 
However, Weber may be referring to the content of the rules as being rational, rather 
than to the mode of creation.
It can be seen that other requirements of rationally oriented social action, for example, 
that the actor undertakes "rational consideration of alternative means to the end", may 
be met if the actor takes account of various consequences of acting in the course of 
achieving his end. In the last example, he may weigh up the possible consequences of 
0-ing (which is not prohibited) or O-ing (which is prohibited) in achieving goal X, 
and may opt for a course of action which minimises any troublesome consequences.
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Weber’s other modes of orientation of social action include action which is oriented to 
an absolute value (wertrational). This, according to Weber, involves "...a conscious 
belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of 
behaviour, entirely for its own sake and independently of any prospects of external 
success...".62 This may entail self-conscious formulation of ultimate values governing 
action, and consistently planned orientation of its detailed course to these values.63 
According to Weber:
"Examples of pure rational orientation to absolute values would be the action of 
persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into practice 
their convictions of what seems to them to be required by duty, honour, the 
pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some 
’cause* no matter in what it consists."64
Judicial action may perhaps involve a form of wertrational action in the sense of belief 
in the legitimacy of the political system, devotion to duty, loyalty to the state. There 
may be elements of this in Weber’s concept of legitimate order. As Weber says,
"Action, especially social action which involves social relationships, may be 
oriented by the actors to a belief (Vorstellung) in the existence of a ’legitimate 
order’ ",65
Such action involves the actor orienting his action by reference to an ’order* of rules:
"As a rule such action in addition is determined by [the actor’s]... subjection to 
an order, the rules governing the department which impose obligations on him, 
which he is usually careful to fulfil, partly because disobedience would carry 
disadvantageous consequences to him, but usually also in part because it would 
be abhorrent to the sense of duty, which, to a greater or lesser extent, is an 
absolute value to him."66
Weber observes that the more a value to which action is oriented is elevated to the
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status of an absolute value, the more ’irrational’ is the corresponding action 
(presumably, in the sense of ’zweck’ - irrational). This is because, in Weber’s view, 
the more unconditionally an actor devotes himself to a value for its own sake, the less 
is he influenced by considerations of the consequences of his action.67 But the purest 
form of zweckrational orientation, involving "the rational achievement of ends without 
relation to fundamental values" is only a limiting case.68
For Weber, traditional behaviour is oriented through the habituation of long practice. 
It lies very close to the borderline of what Weber would call meaningfully oriented 
action.
"For it is very often a matter of almost automatic reaction to habitual stimuli 
which guide behaviour in a course which has been repeatedly followed."69
This type of action shades into two other types of action, usage (Brauch) and custom 
(Sitte). As Weber says,
"An actually existent probability of a uniformity in the orientation of social 
action will be called ’usage’..., if and in so far as the probability of its 
maintenance among a group of persons is determined entirely by its actual 
practice. Usage will be called ’custom’... if the actual performance rests on 
long familiarity."70
Weber stresses that it would be unusual to find concrete cases of any of the types of 
action designated as pure types which were oriented solely in one or other of the ways 
described. Nor, as he points out, does his classification exhaust the possible types of 
action, his object being selectively to formulate "in conceptually pure form certain 
sociologically important types, to which actual action is more or less closely 
approximated."71 A combination of types of behaviour, as corresponding to one or 
more of Weber’s pure types, in varying degrees of strength, would, in the case of any
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given type of social action (for example, judicial action), more readily approximate to 
a sociologically accurate characterisation of the behaviour in question.
II.4 Interpretive Understanding
It will be recalled from earlier discussion that the method of interpretive 
understanding (Verstehen) involves the investigator in attempting to understand the 
subjective meaning of the action of a particular individual under investigation by 
empathising with him through introspection, and by attempting, in a sense, to re-live, 
by imaginative participation, the individual’s experiences. In a sense this involves an 
’extension’ (or, to use Dilthey’s term, a ’projection’) of oneself into the outward 
expressions of the actor which manifest some metal content (his acts, thoughts or 
gestures and so on) to reach the actor’s motive for acting. In the context of 
interpretive understanding however, empathy has limitations, as Weber notes.
"For the verifiable accuracy of interpretation of the meaning of a phenomenon it 
is a great help to be able to put one’s self imaginatively in the place of the actor 
and thus sympathetically to participate in his experiences, but this is not an 
essential condition of meaningful interpretation." 72
As we observed earlier, the attribution of subjective meaning to action by interpretive 
understanding is for Weber only part of the process of establishing a comprehensive 
explanation of social action. The role played by empathy in this process is only a 
facilitating role. As Weber points out, it is merely "a great help" to empathise with a 
subject, but it is not an "essential condition of meaningful interpretation".
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The process of interpretive understanding involves a further requirement. "Empathic 
or appreciative accuracy is attained when, through sympathetic participation, we can 
adequately grasp the emotional context in which the action took place.”73 In this sense, 
emotional context may be similar to Weber’s requirement that any subjective meaning 
(of action) should be viewed in a more inclusive context of meaning, and that such 
meaning should be ’adequately’ grasped.74 Emotional context, however, also implies 
subjective feelings (as opposed to, say, rational motives), and these feelings may, 
according to Weber, underlie ultimate ends or values towards which human action is 
oriented. Hence, emotional reactions such as anxiety, anger, ambition, envy, jealousy, 
love, enthusiasm, pride, and so on may be the outward expression of certain
underlying value orientations. In Weber’s view, the more radically these values differ 
from those of the investigator, the more difficult it is for him to make them 
understandable by imaginatively participating in them.
"These difficulties apply for instance, for people not susceptible to the relevant
values, to many unusual acts of religious and charitable zeal; also certain kinds
of extreme rationalistic fanaticism of the type involved in some forms of the 
ideology of the ’rights of man’ are in a similar position for people who radically 
repudiate such points of view."75
Weber postulates two kinds of interpretive understanding: direct observational
understanding (aktuelles Verstehen) and explanatory understanding (erklarendes 
Verstehen). We will consider each in turn.
Direct observational understanding probably involves observation as such, and not 
understanding in the normal sense. The examples which Weber gives to illustrate this 
type of understanding serve to reinforce this view. They include (the observational 
understanding of) verbal utterances such as: "the proposition two times two equals 
four", and ideas. The suggestion is that understanding of this sort involves
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apprehending data consisting of some mental content. This seems important in the 
case of ’observation* of ideas. Presumably any Diltheian ’expression* may be observed 
then interpreted to reveal its ideative content, but, recalling Habermas,76 the 
pre-eminent form of ’expression* is linguistic expression, whether through the medium 
of the spoken or the written word.
In terms of a practical ’application’ to judicial action of the technique of direct 
observational ’understanding’ (in Weber’s sense), the ’ideas’ that might be ’observed* in 
this context might include the unique modes of legal thought and legal reasoning 
which result, firstly, in the use of legal concepts, secondly, in ways of conceiving of 
human action as, for example, giving rise to legal rights and duties, thirdly, in specific 
modes of interpretation of legal norms, and fourthly, in typical modes of exercising 
judicial discretion. All these ideas find their expression in judgments and legal 
decisions, textbooks, and juristic writings of every kind.
Observational understanding, then, could involve taking account of these sources, 
possibly at best simply acknowledging that they are, or may be, likely sources of 
expression of ideas which have a bearing on the way judges behave.
Explanatory understanding probably approaches ’true’ understanding in the Weberian 
sense. This tries to explain why someone acts as he does, and involves attempting to 
penetrate motives for acting. Unlike observational understanding, which perhaps 
involves information gathering (collecting data etc.), explanatory understanding seeks 
to find reasons. As Weber says,
"Thus we understand in terms of motive the meaning an actor attaches to the
proposition twice two equals four, when he states it or writes it down, in that
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we understand what makes him do this at precisely this moment and in these 
circumstances. Understanding in this sense is attained if we know that he is 
engaged in balancing a ledger or in making a scientific demonstration, or is 
engaged in some other task of which this particular act would be an appropriate 
part.”77
According to Parsons, Weber’s requirement, mentioned earlier, that any act which is 
subject to explanatory understanding be placed in an "intelligible and more inclusive 
context of meaning,"78 refers to a plurality of elements which form a coherent whole 
on the level of meaning. As Parsons puts it, "There are several possible modes of 
meaningful relation between such elements, such as logical consistency, the aesthetic 
harmony of a style, or the appropriateness of means to an end."79 This also involves, 
according to Weber, placing the act in "an understandable sequence of motivation, the 
understanding of which can be treated as an explanation of the actual course of 
behaviour."80 Weber concludes,
"Thus for a science which is concerned with the subjective meaning of action, 
explanation requires a grasp of the complex of meaning in which an actual 
course of understandable action thus interpreted belongs."81
It will be recalled that explanatory understanding by the method of Verstehen must be 
scientifically validated by explanation in terms of causative factors. Unless this is 
done, Verstehen is only a source of hypotheses about human action. As Weber says,
"Every interpretation attempts to attain clarity and certainty, but no matter how 
clear an interpretation as such appears to be from the point of view of meaning, 
it cannot on this account alone claim to be the causally valid interpretation. On 
this level it must remain only a peculiarly plausible hypothesis."82
Weber lists three factors which make it a methodological necessity for the processes of 
causal explanation and explanatory understanding to be mutually verifying. Firstly, 
conscious motives may, even to the actor, conceal real motives which constitute the 
’driving force’ of a given course of action. Conscious motives may also conceal
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’repressions* and it is the task of the sociologist to be aware of all these factors.83 
Secondly, courses of action which appear on the face of it to be similar, (and may 
appear so from a ’causal* or external point of view) may, in Weber’s view, "fit into 
exceedingly various complexes of motive".84 So although these processes may appear 
superficially similar, they may have to be understoood in terms of motives or 
subjective meanings which are "directly opposed".85 In this situation, the causal 
approach, involving explanation in terms of externally observable regularities or 
uniformities, may distort the true character of action if various different, though 
superficially similar, courses of action are thought to be identical. Thirdly, actors in 
any given situation are often subject to "opposing and conflicting impulses", and it 
may often not be possible to assess the relative strengths of these impulses. 
Verification of subjective interpretation "by comparison with the concrete course of 
events" is therefore indispensable.86 This, of course, leads conveniently to the matter 
of sociological causality in Weber’s methodology.
II.5 Causal Explanation
According to Kurt H. Wolff, what is significant about Weber’s definition of 
sociology87 is that,
"...for Max Weber sociology is an enterprise which both interprets or understands 
(namely, meanings) and (causally) explains (namely, events in time); moreover, 
which interprets in order to be able to explain; which, as it were, prepares by 
interpretation its candidates for causal explanation. That is to say, Max Weber 
thought that before we can ask causal questions calling for explanation, we must 
understand what we want to ask causal questions about; we must be able to 
interpret it. Thus, logically, understanding precedes explaining."88
The object of the sociological investigation is the "correct causal interpretation"89 or
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"causal explanation"90 of a concrete, or typical, course of action. In other words, the 
end result of (Weberian) sociological inquiry is explanation of a certain kind: 
explanation in terms of the theoretical imputation of causal relationships and also 
explanation in terms of subjective meanings or motives. This latter type of 
explanation is not denoted by Weber’s term ’causal explanation’, yet if sociology is "a 
science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby 
to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects"91 the suggestion appears to 
be that ultimate (Weberian) sociological explanation is causal explanation, which is 
arrived at by first attaining a grasp of subjective meanings of action, i.e. interpretive 
understanding of the action. The temptation is strong, then, to infer that (the term) 
’causal explanation’ in that context subsumes explanation in terms of subjective 
meaning. This is to an extent borne out by Weber’s insistence that the twin 
requirements of adequacy on the level of meaning and causal adequacy must both be 
present simultaneously for a correct causal interpretation.92
The point here is that even if ’perfect’ adequacy on the level of meaning is attained in 
the course of an investigation this can never compensate for a lack of adequacy on the 
level of causality, and vice versa. As Weber says,
"If adequacy in respect to meaning is lacking, then no matter how high the 
degree of uniformity and how precisely its probability can be numerically 
determined, it is still an incomprehensible statistical probability, whether dealing 
with overt or subjective processes. On the other hand, even the most perfect 
adequacy on the level of meaning has causal significance from a sociological 
point of view only in so far as there is some kind of proof for the existence of a 
probability that action in fact normally takes the course which has been held to 
be meaningful. For this there must be some degree of determinable frequency 
of approximation to an average or a pure type."93
As we have found, interpretive understanding is a technique applied to internal 
meaningful processes: i.e. purely mental complexes of meaning. There can never be
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’perfect* knowledge of the mind of another and therefore the investigator must rely on 
introspection (examination of his own experience of what human experience in general 
amounts to) and an extrapolation from this to the experience of others in order that 
internal meaningful processes of those others may be meaningful to him. But there 
will always exist a ’hiatus* between the investigator’s ascription (or assumption) of 
meaning (which, as we may recall, is always only a "peculiarly plausible hypothesis"94) 
and the actual meaning present in the mind of the actor under investigation. This 
’hiatus’, as Weber seems to suggest, can to some extent be ’bridged’ by applying a 
technique which is appropriate for apprehending empirically observable concrete 
phenomena (i.e. ’events* in time). By this means, the validity of any ascription of 
subjective meaning may be verified. As Weber says,
"... verification of subjective interpretation by comparison with the concrete
course of events is, as in the case of all hypotheses, indispensable."95
Even though a motive (for acting) or intention (to act) may be treated as a ’cause’ of 
the resulting action, the sociological technique of imputing cause, as Weber presents it, 
seems to focus concern not on the motive or intention in itself as a cause of action, 
but on the external ’event’ by which motive or intention is manifested (e.g. a ’verbal 
utterance’, to use Weber’s term). It then seeks to establish a (causal) connection 
between that ’event* and a later ’event’, for example, an act that accords with the 
motive or intention so manifested. Nevertheless, we would apply the quite separate 
technique of interpretive understanding to, for example, the verbal utterance, treated 
for this purpose not as ’an event’ (although that is what it is) but as something 
possessing significance in a specifically ideative and human sense. Weber’s reliance 
upon two techniques of explanation, one appropriate to Geisteswissenschaften and the 
other to Naturwissenschaften does not mean that one technique is subsumed by
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another. They remain, on the contrary, separate and valid techniques in their own 
right, and applicable according to differing interests appropriate to each.
Nevertheless, the outcome of the process (of meaning ascription and causal imputation) 
appears to be a *causal explanation* (perhaps an all-embracing term in Weber’s usage) 
which takes account of the internal and introspective aspect of the process, yielding 
hypotheses about subjective meaning, these hypotheses then being verified by the 
external and empirical aspect of the process (i.e. observation of concrete ’events’ 
which, as we have suggested, may include manifestations of mental content such as 
linguistic expressions). It is therefore surely more accurate to say contra Weber that 
the end result is explanation in terms of subjective meaning as verified or supported 
by the observation of events in time to which causal relationships are imputed. As 
Weber says,
"Statistical uniformities constitute understandable types of action in the sense of 
this discussion, and thus constitute ’sociological generalizations’, only when they 
can be regarded as manifestations of the understandable subjective meaning of a 
course of social action."96
The final point of the analysis ("a correct causal interpretation of a concrete course of 
action") is reached when, according to Weber, "the overt action and the motives have 
both been correctly apprehended and at the same time their relation has become 
meaningfully comprehensible."97
The recognition of the interdependence of the processes of interpretive understanding 
and causal explanation does not assist us with the question of what causal explanation 
actually involves. Weber quite simply fails to elaborate his ideas in sufficient detail to 
enable causal explanation to be applied as a methodological technique. For Weber,
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"...causal explanation depends on being able to determine that there is a 
probability, which in the rare ideal case can be numerically stated, but is always 
in some sense calculable, that a given observable event (overt or subjective) will 
be followed or accompanied by another event."98
There are basically two aspects to this. The first is that the results of causal 
explanation are cast in probabilistic terms. The second is that concrete phenomena are 
reduced to ’observable events’ (whether overt or subjective: the latter presumably 
including manifestations of some mental content) which stand in a causal relation to 
one another, and on a temporal continuum, the earlier event being adjudged a ’cause’ 
of the later event.
Weber’s tendency towards probabilistic ’explanation’ is perhaps an indication of his 
faith in the possibility that social science could be endowed with a degree of 
mathematical precision which would elevate it to the status of ’true’ science in the 
sense of natural science. The possibility, in the ’rare ideal case’ of numerical statement 
implies the use of statistical techniques of research which even in cases falling short of 
the ’ideal’ may allow the actual or assumed calculability of causal relationships to yield 
results which comply with the criteria of causal adequacy set by the investigator.
Nevertheless, the fact that probability is involved should not lead us to suppose that 
the results of sociological investigation will yield anything as powerful as ’certainty* in 
the recognised sense of the term. In fact, certainty is not at all a plausible outcome, as 
Coser points out.99
Raymond Aron100 distinguishes two types of causality in Weber’s thought, historical 
and sociological, the latter involving the specification of causal relationships (between
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events) within a probabilistic framework. Historical causality may in some cases be 
applied in sociological research which, if it is the only technique available (for 
whatever reason, on the assumption that sociological causation is not possible), is, in 
Weber’s view, "the dangerous and uncertain procedure".101 According to Weber, this 
procedure involves an "’imaginary experiment’ which consists in thinking away certain 
elements of a chain of motivation and working out the course of action which would 
probably then ensue, thus arriving at a causal judgment."102
W.G. Runciman explains this procedure more fully. According to him, this version of 
causality involves specifying a ’contrast state’ and then demonstrating that a particular 
condition was ’contingently sufficient’ to bring about the actual state of affairs 
observed, as opposed to the state of affairs that might have obtained without the 
presence of this condition, given the same background of antecedent necessary 
conditions.103 Hence the investigator draws a comparison between a contrast state (of 
affairs) and an actually observed state of affairs. The contrast state of affairs is 
purely an hypothesis. It is the imagined state of affairs which ex hypothesi would 
have obtained if a particular factor had been absent: i.e. the condition or circumstance 
regarded as ’causative’ of, or contingently sufficient for, the actually observed state of 
affairs.
The actual state of affairs necessarily includes the particular factor which subsequently 
has been judged (according to the ’imaginary experiment*) causative of, or 
contingently sufficient for, that state.
Sociological causality, on the other hand, involves the recognition of a regular 
relationship between two events. According to David Hume, causal relationships of
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this type can be recognised only after the experience of the ’constant conjunction’ or 
’regular sequence’ of pairs of events in nature, and after experience of several 
instances of events regularly conjoined, we feel "a determination of the mind to pass 
from one object to its usual attendant".104 This position echoes Alfred Schutz, when he 
considers the postulate of causal adequacy in Weber, and expresses this in terms of 
probability: "A sequence of events is causally adequate to the degree that experience 
teaches us it will probably happen again."105 Moreover, according to Weber, a sequence 
of events is to be considered causally adequate when, and in so far as, "according to 
established generalizations from experience, there is a probability that it will always 
actually occur in the same way".106
We should also note Raymond Aron’s observation107 that a causal relation is never a 
relation established between the totality of conditions obtaining at a given time and the 
totality of conditions obtaining at a preceding time: the relation is individualising and 
therefore partial, and necessarily depends on the investigator’s selection of phenomena 
of interest from the ’totality’ of concrete reality presented to him.
Before leaving the subject of sociological causality in Weber we should give brief 
consideration to causality in the context of social norms (or ’rules’ or ’maxims’
according to Weber’s terminological persuasion). In his essay, The Concept o f
’Following a Rule’108 Weber discusses the hypothesis of a worker who comes to rely on 
the ’chance’ of periodically receiving ’certain metal discs’ or ’pieces of paper’ (money) 
in return for performing certain services, and who knows that this money can be
exchanged for "bread, cabbages, trousers and so on". He knows, moreover, that "...if
anyone thereafter tries to take these objects away from him again, there is a certain 
probability that men with spiked helmets will appear in response to his cries for help
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and will assist him to regain possession of them".109 For Weber, the fact that the 
factory owner can rely on the probability that the worker will perform services (and 
by extension that the worker can rely on the probability that money will be accepted 
in exchange for goods, the retention of which goods, by the worker, is guaranteed by 
’men with spiked helmets’) involves "causal conditions of a certain ’technical’ outcome" 
which in a logical sense, in Weber’s view, are no different because ’conscious 
processes’ are inserted into the causal chain (i.e. the act of thought which is 
"co-operation according to rules") than similar causal conditions found in other 
situations envisaged by Weber, including Weber’s own example: that the formation of x 
tonnes of pig iron will result from the use of y tonnes of ore in space z.
Weber’s example, of course, characterises ’concrete reality’ in the sense of 
Naturwissenschaften. According to Weber, the rules to which the factory owner, 
worker and countless others orient their behaviour are ’maxims’ which causally affect 
the empirical behaviour of individuals, and which are ’rules’ in the causal sense which 
have been "...acquired by reasoned experience or learned from others, of the type ’If I 
do x, in accordance with empirical rules, y will result’".110 Weber concludes that,
"[the actor]...has to calculate, in the light of experience, the mode of reaction of 
the ’external world’ to certain modes of his own behaviour. It makes not the 
slightest difference to the ’logical’ character of the ’maxims’ that in the one case 
these include human reactions, while in the other they include only reactions by 
animals, plants and ’inanimate’ natural objects."111
Crucially, though, the norms or maxims of behaviour, when they are considered by 
Weber to be ’causes’ or determinants of human action, are ’causes’ purely in an 
empirical sense, the point being that the investigator can only have knowledge of what 
is empirically unknowable (e.g. the content of the mind of another individual) 
through the empirical, externally observable manifestation of what is empirically
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known only to that other individual. Hence the following of a norm, by conscious 
orientation of his behaviour by reference to that norm, is ’empirical* and ’causal’ in an 
unique sense. As Weber says,
When...it is said that the rule in question whether moral, conventional or 
teleological, is the ’cause’ of a certain action, this is of course an extremely 
imprecise way of putting it: it is not the ’ideal validity’ of a norm, but the 
empirical representation in the mind of an agent that the norm ’ought to be 
applied’ in his behaviour which is the cause”. 112
The ’representation in the mind of an agent’ is clearly something known only to the 
agent. If an observer wishes to know in a rigorously empirical or causal sense whether 
a given actor has oriented his action in a given case by reference to a specific norm he 
must observe what is externally observable: outward manifestations of speech, action 
and therefore of mental content, but also of action in some way adjusted or altered in 
consequence of the existence of the norm. He must then apply his knowledge of 
subjective meanings of human action (i.e. that, by and large, action may be 
influenced by norms) by conferring meaning on manifestations of mental content. The 
meaning so conferred must then be combined with the purely empirical observation of 
the constant conjunction or regular sequence of ’events’: i.e. one event following 
another.
Thus if A orients his actions by reference to norm N requiring act 0, we may observe 
one event: the verbal utterance by which A expresses an intention to perform act 0 in 
order to comply with norm N. From the point of view of subjective meaning, this is 
something meaningful in human terms: the use of language (certain sounds which are 
symbolic of mental content according to a conventional background of known 
techniques of communicating that content); the particular use of language in this 
specific context; the desire to orient behaviour by reference to a norm embodying an
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’ought* (this is perhaps something uniquely ’human’); and other possibly presupposed 
background reasons for complying with this norm in particular (e.g. it is a legal norm 
or a moral injunction, and so on).
From the purely empirical point of view (which is necessarily combined with the point 
of view of subjective meaning), we mechanically observe a particular sequence of 
sounds being uttered. If the actor being observed is speaking a language which is 
’foreign’ relative to the observer, the sounds may be ’meaning-neutral’, though not 
meaningless. We may then observe another event: the performance of act 0. From the 
point of view of subjective meaning, we know that actor A has oriented his action by 
reference to norm N in order to comply with norm N and in accordance also with his 
expressed intention so to comply. We are also already aware of the background 
subjective meanings which attended this event and which are therefore relevant in the 
context of our understanding of events which may flow from this.
From the purely empirical point of view, we mechanically observe act 0 being 
performed. If for some reason the language spoken by actor A is meaning neutral to 
us (qua observer) on account of the language being, for example, ’foreign,’ we may 
only observe a particular sequence of sounds being uttered (an ’event’) in constant 
conjunction with the supervening performance of act 0 (another ’event’) and draw 
necessary conclusions from this in accordance with a ’behaviourist* perspective. Our 
conclusions, though adequate on the level of causality, will be inadequate on the level 
of meaning.
Thus, taking a purely empirical perspective, if we noted that the utterance of, for 
example, the following ’sounds’: "I refuse to 0 in accordance with norm N" (one
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’event’): is typically followed by the performance of act 0 (another ’event’), we would 
be completely unaware of the fact that a contradiction in meaning exists here, and that 
knowledge of this contradiction would allow us to draw other conclusions, for 
example, that the actor has mistaken the commonly observed linguistic conventions 
surrounding the use of any of the words used in his utterance (for example, mistaking 
’refuse’ for ’intend’, or thinking that the act of 0-ing actually involves O-ing, which is 
what he really wishes to refuse to do, and so on). He may also be attempting to 
mislead the observer. Hence, contradictions with respect to meaning would not be 
brought to light by a purely mechanical observation of regularities of empirical 
’events’.
But equally, if the observer has access to subjective meanings, and observes that a 
typical ’event’ in the example given (i.e. the utterance of the words "I refuse to 0 in 
accordance with norm N") is typically followed by another ’event’ (i.e. the 
performance of act 0), this empirical datum enables him to verify subjective meaning 
in that he may seek to question whether the subjective meaning of the action as 
manifested in the verbal utterance is the ’true’ or ’correct’ subjective meaning with 
respect to that actor: i.e. does he really mean "I refuse to 0 in accordance with norm 
N" or does he not instead mean (e.g.) "I refuse to O" simpliciterl
The combination of interpretive understanding and causal explanation and the 
requirement that adequacy on the level of meaning and adequacy on the level of 
causality are mutually verifying processes, are brought together in the legal context in 
what Weber calls the ’sociological point of view’. This, according to Weber, is the 
point of view to be adopted in speaking of ’law’, ’legal order’ or ’legal proposition’, 
and is characterised in the following way:
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"...if we take the [sociological] point of view, we ask: What actually happens in a 
group owing to the probability that persons engaged in social action 
(Gemeinschaftshandeln), especially those exerting a socially relevant amount of 
power, subjectively consider certain norms as valid and practically act according 
to them, in other words, orient their own conduct towards these norms?"113
This is combined with a sociological interest in the "legal guarantees and their 
underlying normative conceptions" which are treated as "consequences and as causes or 
concomitant causes of certain regularities of human action", but we shall return to this 
in chapter V.114 In the meantime, we should note that the sociological point of view 
concerns itself in particular with (causal) probabilities that persons engaged in social 
action, "especially those exerting a socially relevant amount o f power" orient their 
action by reference to legal norms. As we will consider later, this refers to the need 
to focus sociological attention upon the action of judges and other officials who, by 
virtue of the social power which they exercise in the context of their official roles, in 
some way ’generate’ regularities of human action, not only in terms of their own 
action, but in terms of action of others whose action is in some way oriented by 
reference to the action of officials.
For present purposes, then, judicial action should be looked upon as being at least in 
theory capable of analysis into ’events’ which stand in causal relationships to one 
another, but only to the extent that causal imputation lends itself to such analysis, to a 
greater or lesser degree of success. It may however be more rewarding to consider 
such action as consisting of an endless stream of ’events’ each of which, taken with 
other ’events’, is at any given time capable of being analysed as a ’preceding event’ in 
relation to a ’supervening event’ and a ’supervening event’ in relation to a ’preceding 
event’ all in terms of criteria of individualisation considered appropriate for purposes 
of the investigation.
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II.6 The Ideal Type
The analytical (’mental*) construct (Gedankenbild) or methodological device of the ideal 
type represents, as Raymond Aron puts it,115 the ’logical conclusion’ of a number of 
strands of thought underlying Weber’s methodological writings. The infinite plurality 
and multiplicity of concrete reality is, as always for Weber, the starting point
"Now, as soon as we attempt to reflect about the way in which life confronts us 
in immediate concrete situations, it presents an infinite multiplicity of 
successively and coexistently emerging and disappearing events, both ’within* 
and ’outside* ourselves. The absolute infinitude of this multiplicity is seen to 
remain undiminished even when our attention is focused on a single ’object’, for 
instance, a concrete act of exchange, as soon as we seriously attempt an 
exhaustive description of all the individual components of this ’individual 
phenomenon’, to say nothing of explaining it causally."116
Order is brought to this ’chaos’ because only the part of this reality is significant 
which is related to the values with which reality is approached. These values 
influence the investigator in his attempt to formulate criteria which will eventually 
guide his selection of phenomena of interest. According to H.H. Bruun, it follows 
from this that because a scientific reproduction of reality is both a practical and 
logical impossibility all scientific disciplines (whether or not they are conscious of this) 
must utilise concepts, and these concepts can only embrace the parts of reality 
considered of significance to the investigator.117 The ideal type is such a concept: it 
articulates similarities which occur in a great number of individual concrete 
phenomena. These phenomena may be subsumed under the generalising terms of the 
concept. Each individual datum is seen as a case or an instance (or a contributory 
factor to a case or instance) of the generic type. As we have already seen, according 
to Weber,
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"An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of 
view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present 
and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged 
according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical 
construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct...cannot 
be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia"118
The ideal type also represents the logical conclusion of Weber’s method of Verstehen. 
The investigator first attempts to ascribe subjective meaning which is the "actual 
existing meaning in the given concrete case of a particular actor", or "the average or 
approximate meaning attributable to a given plurality of actors".119 But crucially, the 
data yielded by this process enable the investigator (and qualify him) to construct "the 
theoretically conceived pure type of subjective meaning attributed to the hypothetical 
actor or actors in a given type of action."120 The actors are ’hypothetical’ because the 
theoretically conceived subjective meaning does not relate to any concrete actor in 
particular, but incorporates similarities found across a range of typical cases. The 
subjective meaning incorporated in such an ideal-type construct is also theoretically 
conceived because it represents, as Weber points out, a synthesis of a great many 
concrete individual phenomena. Ideal-typical subjective meaning is exemplified in 
Weber’s definition of the subjective notion of ’obedience*. Thus,
"’Obedience* will be taken to mean that the action of the person obeying follows 
in essentials such a course that the content of the command may be taken to 
have become the basis of action for its own sake. Furthermore, the fact that it 
is so taken is referable only to the formal obligation, without regard to the 
actor’s own attitude to the value or lack of value of the content of the command 
as such."121
The incorporation of a theoretically conceived yet ’typical’ subjective meaning into an 
ideal-type construct suggests that if a similar procedure attends the treatment of 
ideal-typical causal explanation, then Weber’s method of causal explanation should also 
find its ’apotheosis* in the conceptual apparatus of the ideal type. This certainly
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appears to be so, for here the ’concrete individual phenomena’ which are drawn upon 
as data for inclusion in the ideal type would consist of typical sequences of causally 
linked ’events’, i.e. pluralities of ’events’ which occur in ’constant conjunction’, to use 
the Humean term. These causal relationships, in accordance with Weber’s general 
methodological stance, would be expressed in terms of probability. In his typology of 
legitimate orders Weber’s definition of ’convention* well illustrates the point.
"A system of order will be called convention so far as its validity is externally 
guaranteed by the probability that deviation from it within a given social group 
will result in a relatively general and practically significant reaction of 
disapproval."122
If ’events* occur in constant conjunction or regular sequence, then according to 
Weber’s criterion of causal adequacy, "established generalizations from experience" will 
yield a probability that the events "will always actually occur in the same way". For 
incorporation into an ideal-type construct, however, such ’events’ must also correspond 
to typical subjective meanings. To this extent the requirements of causal adequacy 
and adequacy on the level of meaning must coexist in the ideal type for a correct 
causal interpretation of a typical course of action.123
Weber’s preoccupation with rationality in human action also culminates in his 
preference for the incorporation of rational processes into ideal-type constructs. 
Rationality, then, for purposes of the present discussion is the final strand of 
Weberian thought whose logical conclusion is found in the analytical construct of the 
ideal type. Weber favours rational processes because the construction of a purely 
rational course of action"... serves the sociologist as a type (’ideal type’) which has the 
merit of clear understandability and lack of ambiguity."124
Depending on the context, and in particular, on the type of action involved,
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’rationality* presumably consists in modes of thinking which exhibit (for example) 
logical consistency, clarity of thought, coherence, non-contradiction and conceptual 
precision.
As we observed earlier, the ideal type states what course a given type of action would 
take i f  it were strictly rational, unaffected by errors or emotional factors.125 We saw 
that this may involve hypothesis on the part of the investigator, to the extent, possibly, 
of suppressing factors deemed ’irrational’, and of supplying factors deemed ’rational*, 
and it is clear for this reason and for others already suggested that the ideal-type 
construct is not intended to be a reconstruction or description of reality. As Weber 
says,
"It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of 
expression to such a description."126
The essential element of rationality accounts for the fact that the ideal type does not 
simply represent the typical, but represents also the ideal. The ideality of the 
construct lies in its freedom from irrational elements of behaviour and its ’purity* in 
terms of rationality. Thus, according to Weber,
"For the purposes of a typological scientific analysis it is convenient to treat all 
irrational, affectually determined elements of behaviour as factors of deviation 
from a conceptually pure type of rational action."127
Weber gives as an example a panic on the stock exchange. We would begin to analyse 
this by attempting to hypothesise what direction action would have taken if it had not 
been influenced by ’irrational* factors. Thereafter any irrational components may 
account for the observed deviations from the hypothetical course.128 But Weber stresses 
that the ideality of the rational ideal type is only a methodological device.129 As 
Harold Fallding points out, the crucial point to grasp about the type (seen as ’utopia’,
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to use Weber’s term) is that it represents what the sociologist believes those under 
study would be striving for in pursuing and achieving their goals, under the assumed 
condition that they are not fettered by "the compromises of life".130 What we keep in, 
or put into, the rational construct are actions that, according to the sociologist, 
hypothesising the most favourable background conditions, are rationally required by 
the end in view. This is sensible, according to Fallding,
"...because experience convinces us that rationality is one of the conditions of 
successful social action. Although the ideal type is a fiction, then, it is not 
idealized in any purely arbitrary way. It is commended to us as a measuring rod 
for actual cases. But there would be no virtue in measuring a case’s deviance 
from a purely arbitrary norm. The ideal type is a relevant standard for 
measuring social phenomena because it measures a case’s degree of 
self-realization."181
According to Weber, conceptual precision of sociological concepts can be achieved if 
the highest possible degree of adequacy on the level of meaning is strived for, and this 
aim can in turn be realised to a high degree if the concepts and generalisations (of the 
ideal-type construct) formulate rational processes.182 The suggestion is that the ’purest’ 
and most ’ideal’ ideal types are those which tend towards the rational, and in which 
the construct levels out the irrational, thus facilitating a conception of the type’s own 
self-realisation.
Once the investigator has expended effort in formulating an ideal type, he might well 
ask towards what practical ends can the construct be applied. Coser assists us here:
"An ideal type is an analytical construct that serves the investigator as a 
measuring rod to ascertain similarities as well as deviations in concrete cases. It 
provides the basic method for comparative study."188
This resonates with Weber’s observation that by comparing concrete courses of action 
with the ideal type "it is possible to understand the ways in which actual action is
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influenced by irrational factors of all sorts, such as affects and errors, in that they 
account for the deviation from the line of conduct which would be expected on the 
hypothesis that the action were purely rational."184 J.W.N. Watkins* analogy, 
encountered earlier,185 that we can improve our appreciation of the shape of a roughly 
circular object by placing over it an accurate tracing of a circle, is instructive in this 
context.
But surely there must be other applications of the ideal type, as, after all, we might 
not be especially concerned to identify the irrational in a given concrete course of 
action.
The most obvious use is that the type construct helps to bring ’order* to ’chaos*.186 
Moreover, even apart from any practical application to empirical data collected by the 
investigator, the construct may assist us to recognise in purely theoretical terms the 
significant or defining characteristics, or the outstanding features of a particular type 
of social action. This may allow us, again in theoretical terms only, to separate the 
defining charateristics from the inessential or peripheral elements.
Furthermore, the construct may be helpful, in the context of a comparative study, in 
aiding identification of the unique features or peculiarities (not necessarily ’irrational’ 
factors or ’factors of deviation*) of an observed type of action.
It may also serve as a model for identifying important ’structural* features of a given 
course of action: for example, normative ’structures’ such as, for instance, the 
constitution of a political or social entity.
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Furthermore, the type, may enable us to identify a particular course of action as a 
type: i.e. as having tolerably well-defined boundaries which set the action apart from 
other types of action. This may allow us to form judgments about the relationship of 
one type of action to other types whose boundaries may also be similarly defined. As 
boundaries obviously lie at the periphery of a phenomenon, the ideal type should help 
us to distinguish central cases from peripheral cases in the application of the type to 
concrete phenomena.
It must also follow from the methodological requirement to incorporate typical 
subjective meanings into the construct that the articulation in theoretical terms of such 
meanings will enable the investigator to gain a clear impression of the defining 
characteristics of observed courses of action. If the subjective meaning of a concrete 
course of action corresponds only approximately to an appropriate type, the type may 
nevertheless be employed selectively as a framework by which the investigator may 
construct his own ideal type of the action in question.
Finally, the methodological requirement to express in terms of probability causal 
relationships between ’events* which have been selected for inclusion in the construct, 
may assist the investigator to formulate criteria of individuation of ’events’ considered 
to stand in a causal relationship with respect to other ’events’. It may also allow him 
to reach a better understanding of observed concrete phenomena if he is aware of 
typical causal relations obtaining between ’events’ so individuated if these have been 
included in an appropriate ideal type.
According to Aron, there are three categories of ideal-type construct in Weber’s 
thought. First, there are ideal types of historical particulars. Here the sociologist
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selects a number of features from an historical whole and presents it ideal-typically. 
Aron gives capitalism as an example.137 The second species of ideal type designates 
abstract elements of an historical reality, elements, that is, which are found in a large 
number of cases. These are categorised by Aron on a continuum of increasing 
abstraction. The examples he gives are firstly, bureaucracy and feudalism; secondly, 
the three types of ’domination*: rational, traditional and charismatic; and thirdly, the 
types of action: purpose-rational action, value-rational action, traditional action and 
affectual action. The third species of Weberian ideal type is the type which 
constitutes "rationalizing reconstructions of a particular kind of behavior".138 The 
example given by Aron is the ideal-typical reconstruction of the pure economic 
subject.
This last species of Weberian ideal type is especially significant in the present context 
because in chapter VI we attempt to formulate such an ideal-type construct of the 
incumbent o f the ultimate judicial office.
But why is judicial social action worthy of sociological typification for purposes of a
sociological analysis of the jural relation? One of the reasons, it is suggested, arises
from an assumption that ’law* in at least one of its manifestations is to be understood
in the sense of the Weberian category of ’guaranteed law’, that is, in the sense that 
there exists a ’coercive apparatus* consisting of "one or more persons whose special 
task it is to hold themselves ready to apply specially provided means of coercion (legal 
coercion) for the purpose of norm enforcement."139
The sociological interest of a phenomenon such as this is clear (and again is suggested 
by Weber): "...the legal guarantees and their underlying normative conceptions are of
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interest both as consequences and as causes or concomitant causes of certain 
regularities of human action...or of regularities of natural occurrences engendered by 
human action...".140 The fact is that much human action follows causal regularities not 
only because action is oriented to legal norms, but because special coercive apparatuses 
exist which as a matter of empirical fact under appropriate conditions take action to 
ensure compliance with legal norms or apply sanctions in response to contraventions of 
such norms.
But this only partially accounts for the sociological significance of judicial action. The 
key to understanding the importance of judicial action is that the mobilisation of the 
specifically coercive and sanction-exacting mechanisms (a police force, a prison 
service, sheriff officers and messengers-at-arms) is conditional upon the direction or 
judgment of an appropriate tribunal. The fact that certain forces within society which 
exercise social power (and which are, however, by no means the only such forces) are 
contained or kept in check by an interposing mechanism of tribunals regulating the use 
of that power, compels us to direct our interest towards discovering the nature of 
judicial action, and to understand, both interpretively and causally, the central 
components of that action.
But what is perhaps of even greater sociological significance is that because judicial 
action mobilises coercive and sanction-exacting forces in society countless individuals 
in attempting to imagine the legal ’consequences* of their action or the action of 
others, may strive to adopt the same perspective as an ultimate judge. In this way, the 
individual may visualise what the legal result would be of a given course of action or 
of any legally relevant ’facts* if  a dispute has arisen following the occurrence of such 
’facts* and this dispute has been litigated to a point in the system where it has been
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finally and authoritatively determined. What this means is that these countless others 
either by themselves or with the assistance of legally qualified professionals employ (or 
purport to employ) the same techniques of legal reasoning, or techniques of legal 
rationalisation, which would be employed throughout and at the ultimate hierarchical 
level of the legal system. By orienting their action in accordance with this ultimate 
legal perspective certain regularities (on a truly vast scale) result. This seems 
justification enough for identifying judicial social action as being of sociological 
interest.
In the next chapter we will consider the centrality of the normative component of 
human action and give attention to the principal functions of the social norm. This 
will hopefully clarify the notion of normative meaning and of legal meaning, and thus 
provide a basis for the consideration of the subjective meaning of judicial action. The 
conceptual apparatus of the jural relation, it will be claimed, is deeply rooted in this 
subjective meaning. Furthermore, for theoretical purposes, the jural relation will be 
treated as an ’emanation* from the hierarchically ultimate judicial perspective 
ideal-typified in the hypothetical judge, Iudex.
Ill
ACTION AND THE SOCIAL NORM
III. 1 The Normative Component of Human Action
In the preceding chapter it was suggested that human action can often be accounted 
subjectively meaningful in terms of the relation which it bears to a social norm 
functioning as a motivating influence which in some sense acts upon the individual 
and determines his action. In this chapter we will consider the implications of this 
suggestion by examining the ways in which the social norm functions in human society 
as a means by which action is both evaluated and oriented. Each of these terms will 
be examined later in this chapter. Other aspects of the normative component of 
human action will be considered as an essential preliminary to reaching an 
understanding of judicial social action, and through this ultimately an understanding 
of the jural relation.
The centrality of the normative component of human action was recognised by the 
American sociologist Talcott Parsons (1902 - 1979) who has been one of the principal 
exponents of the sociology of Max Weber in the United States. Parsons locates the 
normative tendency in human action within his conceptual scheme of ’action* by 
adopting what seems at times to be an extreme position. At one point, for example, 
he argues:
"A normative orientation is fundamental to the schema of action in the same 
sense that space is fundamental to that of the classical mechanics: in terms of the 
given conceptual scheme there is no such thing as action except as effort to 
conform with norms just as there is no such thing as motion except as change of 
location in space."1
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Weber for one would place somewhat less emphasis than Parsons on the normative 
component of human action and indeed actually describes a species of social action 
which, despite having all the indiciae of normatively oriented action (in terms of 
stability, invariance, uniformity and so on) is in fact almost entirely instrumentally 
rational in the sense of being governed by the pursuit of individual ends, i.e. it is a 
type of zweckrational action.2 Although for Parsons the normative component of social 
action appears to be a definitional prerequisite of the concept of ’action*,8 the actual 
contribution made by the normative component in terms of resultant stability and 
regularity of action, can be discerned in David Lockwood’s more moderate version of 
Parsons’ theoretical stance:
"For Parsons, the social system is a system of action. It is made up of the 
interactions of individuals. Of special concern to sociology is the fact that such 
interactions are not random but mediated by common standards of evaluation. 
...The regularity, or patterning, of interaction is made possible through the 
existence of norms which control the behaviour of actors. Indeed, a stabilized 
social system is one in which behaviour is regulated in this way, and, as such, is 
a major point of reference for the sociological analysis of the dynamics of social 
systems."4
A convenient starting point for our discussion of the normative component of human 
action is Parsons’ definition of a stable system of interaction. According to Parsons 
and Shils, processes of interaction take place "between two or more actors":5 the 
interaction of ego and alter is the most elementary form of social system.6 Clearly, one 
person cannot in any meaningful social sense ’interact’ with himself. Interaction is 
probably best conceived of as involving mutual social action (in the Weberian sense of 
action "oriented to the past, present or expected future behaviour of others" 7) in 
which each interacting participant (i.e. actor participating in the interaction process) 
acts, or orients his action, with respect to the other participants. Parsons* concept of 
interaction bears similarity to Weber’s concept of the social relationship, but Parsons’ 
concept is distinguished by its dependence on the assumption of the necessary 
normativity of action. In Parsons’ defence, however, we might argue that although it
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is overstating the position to assert that all action or interaction has a normative 
component, certainly most versions of stable action or interaction have a normative 
component, and in many cases it is precisely because of this that the action or 
interaction is stable.
Weber defines ’social relationship’ as "the behaviour of a plurality of actors in so far 
as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of the others 
and is oriented in these terms."8 Weber adds that as a defining criterion, "it is essential 
that there should be at least a minimum of mutual orientation of the action of each to 
that of the others."9
The meaningful content of a social relationship (that is, its subjective meaning) can,
for Weber, be various, for example, conflict, hostility, sexual attraction, friendship,
loyalty or economic exchange. But in Weber’s analysis, the normative component of a
social relationship is strictly limited to the governance of the meaningful content
which remains relatively constant through time. Here the meaningful content may be
capable of formulation in terms of ’maxims’:
"The meaningful content which remains relatively constant in a social 
relationship is capable of formulation in terms of maxims which the parties 
concerned expect to be adhered to by their partners on the average and 
approximately."10
At this point Weber’s position is quite close to that of Parsons since, crucially, for 
Parsons,
"It can be shown that, within the action frame of reference, stable interaction 
implies that acts acquire ’meanings’ which are interpreted with reference to a 
common set of normative conceptions."11
Weber’s influence on Parsons’ sociology can be seen in the latter’s dependence on the 
concept of meaning as a theoretically postulated component of human action. In this
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context, meaning in Parsons’ sense denotes the part of the subjective meaning of 
human action in terms of which human action may be explicable through a knowledge 
of the social norms by reference to which individuals evaluate and orient their own 
social action, and in so doing may also evaluate (and act upon) the action, social or 
otherwise, of others. We will refer to this subjective meaning as normative meaning. 
In this chapter we shall use as a basis for the discussion of the concept of normative 
meaning a model of a stable system of interaction which is employed by Parsons, that 
of the game.
According to Parsons a game, such as chess, can be used to illustrate the essentials of 
an interaction system. Parsons* stable system of interaction will be used to clarify 
firstly, the regulative, evaluative and orientative functions of the social norm, and 
secondly the evaluative and orientative component of the subjective meaning of social 
action in terms of which, on the one hand, the individual evaluates and orients his own 
social action by reference to social norms, and on the other hand, the individual 
evaluates the action of others by reference to social norms with a view to the 
orientation o f his own action.
But before turning to consider these matters we should first attempt to reach a 
preliminary understanding of the process by which human action might be said to 
acquire normative meaning, recalling Parsons* observation. For this purpose a 
speculative scheme is proposed which indicates the stages by which action becomes, in 
a sense, ’normatised’ or subject to governance by social norms, and then becomes 
meaningful by reference to those norms. This speculative scheme attempts to show 
how the action of *0-ing* might become ’normatised’ through a particular course of 
development. We should not look upon the scheme as following any necessary
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chronological sequence, though certain stages more naturally precede or follow others. 
Indeed, some stages may under certain circumstances be thought to be interchangeable 
with, or be subsumed by, others.
To begin with, there may be a recurrence of the act of 0-ing within a process of 
interaction among participants in the interaction. The regular or periodical occurrence 
of the act of 0-ing may be acknowledged or noted by the participants, although it is 
not strictly necessary that the participants actually acknowledge to one another that this 
act occurs. It is possible that the act of 0-ing either could have occurred only once or 
is considered, hypothetically, to be capable of occurring at some future time and still 
be the subject of the ’normalisation’ process.
The participants in the interaction process may identify interests which the act of 
0-ing in some way affects whether advantageously or disadvantageously. Thus, if 
0-ing causes or is likely to cause (e.g.) physical harm, mental anguish, damage to 
property, and so on, it may be desirable to prohibit 0-ing. On the other hand, if 
0-ing is likely to advance certain interests, for example, concerted action advancing 
communal interests, it may be desirable to make 0-ing obligatory.
The participants may then attribute value to the act of 0-ing, i.e. they make value 
judgments about this act. Is 0-ing a good or a bad thing? Is it desirable or 
undesirable, worthy of approval or disapproval? This exercise may lend itself to the 
making of more sophisticated value judgments, as for example on a value continuum 
of aesthetic to non-aesthetic, and so on. The evaluation of the act of 0-ing may 
involve evaluation by reference to existing normative standards: moral standards, 
ethical norms, custom, religious belief, and so on. We may assume that at this stage
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the participants in the interaction process do not actually feel obliged either to 0 or to 
refrain from 0-ing according to any existing normative standards, although such 
standards may ultimately influence their judgment, e.g. analogies may be drawn 
between the act of 0-ing and other acts which are already governed by existing 
normative standards.
The participants in the interaction process may then discuss and share opinions about 
the act of 0-ing and may share and exchange their own personally held views or 
beliefs as regards this act, and about any interests affected or likely to be affected by 
the act. This forum may cause participants to moderate their opinion or to feel more 
strongly about the act of 0-ing, and this may lead to unanimity of opinion about the 
act, or, as is more likely, to broad overall consensus.
The process of opinion-sharing may eventually result in the interacting participants’ 
attributing deontic evaluations to the act of 0-ing, in the sense of: ’ought the act of 
0-ing to be the subject of regulation?’ Furthermore, the attribution of value to, and 
exchange of opinion about, the act of 0-ing may produce value judgments which 
involve the use of deontic language: ’in my opinion one ought not to 0’ or ’in my 
opinion one ought to 0 only under circumstances n’, and so on. Again, opinions may 
be exchanged about whether, in a general sense, one should not 0 and so on, and this 
may again lead to unanimity or broad overall consensus.
The interacting participants may then attribute a norm (to the act of 0-ing) which is 
considered applicable on the occurrence of this act following the explicit mutual 
acknowledgment by the participants of the appropriateness of having such a norm 
applied to that act within that social environment. It may then be possible to
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articulate a norm of the type: ’no-one shall 0’, or, ’0-ing is prohibited’. This stage in 
our developmental model bears a similarity to Roberto M. Unger’s depiction of 
customary law:
"In the broadest sense, law is simply any recurring mode of interaction 
among individuals and groups, together with the more or less explicit 
acknowledgment by these groups and individuals that such patterns of 
interaction produce reciprocal expectations of conduct that ought to be 
satisfied. I shall call this customary or interactional law.”12
The participants may then make judgments as to whether the act of 0-ing ought 
indeed to be subject (or to continue to be subject) to governance by a norm or norms, 
e.g. is it a good thing or a bad thing that one should be prohibited from 0-ing?
On the assumption that a norm is in fact established which governs the act of 0-ing, 
and that participants actually orient their action by reference to the norm (at least for 
a period of time), the norm in question may eventually become ’internalised’ to the 
effect of making the behaviour governed by the norm in some way habitual or 
automatic. In this context, action may be oriented by reference to the appropriate 
norm without any conscious acknowledgment of the norm as such. The sociologist 
Georg Simmel, in the context of a discussion of conscience (’moral consciousness’), 
makes an observation which is helpful in the present context:
"What is useful to the species and the group, the argument runs, and what 
the group, therefore, requests of its members for the sake of its own 
maintenance, is gradually bred into the individual as an instinct. He thus 
comes to contain it in himself, as his own, autonomous feeling, in addition 
to his personal feelings properly speaking, and thus often in contrast to 
them. ...Society confronts the individual with precepts. He becomes 
habituated to their compulsory character until the cruder and subtler 
means of compulsion are no longer necessary. His nature may thereby be 
so formed or deformed that he acts by these precepts as if on impulse, 
with a consistent and direct will which is not conscious of any law."13
Internalisation (of normative standards) may produce expectations (that persons other
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than oneself ought or ought not to 0). Correspondingly, it may also produce 
obligations (that one ought or ought not to 0 oneself). Expectation and obligation may 
come together in one actor in that he both expects others not to 0 (or to 0) and feels 
obliged not to 0 (or to 0) himself.
Given that many within the interaction process may have similar or approximately 
similar attitudes and that they acknowledge that the norms applicable to the act of 
0-ing are considered to be effective and operative within that social environment, a 
social norm might then be said to exist to the effect of prohibiting (or rendering 
obligatory) the act of 0-ing. It is helpful at this point to consider Weber’s notion of 
the empirical validity of norms. For sociological purposes, this means that the validity 
of a norm is judged according to the extent to which it functions as an "actual 
determinant of human conduct".14 If, in an empirical sense, an actor by virtue of the 
subjective meaning of his action orients his conduct by reference to a social norm and 
does so to an empirically measurable degree (for example, in terms of a statable 
probability) then the norm, for Weber, is empirically valid in the sense that it actually 
determines human conduct.
Any further stages of the developmental scheme would necessarily presuppose 
empirically valid social norms in terms of which the individual may conceive of his 
own action and that of others as meaningful by reference to such norms.
Having speculatively considered how a particular mode of action might acquire 
normative meaning through a given course of development, it is convenient now to 
return to the discussion of Parsons* stable system of interaction in order to examine 
from the point of view of participant actors, various levels on which meaning can
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exist. In this case, the stable system of interaction in question is an orderly (!) game 
of chess. After this, we will consider Parsons* definition of a stable system of 
interaction,15 and this will serve as a basis for discussion in the remainder of this 
chapter of, firstly, the expectational and obligational components of stable interaction, 
secondly, the principal functions of the social norm, thirdly, normative meaning, 
fourthly the relationality of social action, and lastly relationality in the context of the 
game model.
Although Parsons* notion of stable interaction happens to involve co-operative 
interaction, it is not suggested that only co-operative human interaction exhibits the 
quality of being ’stable* by virtue of being governed by norms. Human conflict can be 
’stable* for, as Weber points out in the course of a discussion of the concept of 
’conflict’, there are ”all manner of continuous transitions from the bloody type of 
conflict which, setting aside all rules, aims at the destruction of the adversary, to the 
case of the battles of medieval chivalry, bound as they were to the strictest 
conventions...".16 Thus human interaction, both co-operative and confrontational, may 
possess the quality of being ’stable’ by virtue of being governed by norms. The 
choice, in the present context, of Parsons’ stable system of co-operative interaction 
does not overlook the possibility of stable non-co-operative human interaction, which 
is stable precisely because it is governed by norms. It might perhaps be argued, 
however, that a model of a stable system of co-operative human interaction is a 
paradigm case of ’successful’ or ’functional* social action, and as such is arguably the 
best model for illustrating the normative component of human action.
As previously observed, Parsons’ example of the chess game situation is introduced in 
the context of his discussion of interaction.
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"The essentials of the interaction situation can be illustrated by any two-player 
game, such as chess. Each player is presumed to have some motivation to 
participate in the game, including a ’desire to win*. Hence, he has a goal, and, 
relative to this, some conception of effective ’strategies’. ...the meaningfulness 
of the goals and the stability of the generalized pattern of facilities depend on 
the existence of a well defined set of rules... . Without such rules the 
interactive process could not be stable ... neither player would know what was 
expected of him or what the consequences of a given set of moves would be."17
For Parsons, therefore, the meaning ascribed to a game of chess by players exists on 
several levels.
First, each player has a motivation to participate. It might be desirable for its own 
sake to participate. This has resonances of Weber’s wertrational (value rational) mode 
of orientation of action, in which the individual orients his action in accordance with 
the value that participation in the game for its own sake is a ’good thing’ in itself. 
This value may be treated (by players) as a sufficient ground for participating without 
needing to give further reasons.
Second, in playing, each player may pursue a goal which includes the desire to win, 
or, particularly in the case of chess, the will to achieve some kind of intellectual 
domination of an opponent. This has a clear association with Weber’s zweckrational 
(purpose rational) mode of orientation of action, in which the desired end is the 
winning of the game.
I
Third, each player may formulate strategies for play. This would involve the rational 
formulation of a particular means of winning the game or of gaining advantages 
which, taken cumulatively, may enable a player eventually to win the game.
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Fourth, stability of the conduct of the game will be achieved by each player’s adhering 
to, or orienting his action by reference to, the rules of the game. Stability of 
expectations of each player with respect to the action of the other player and any 
accompanying feeling of ’obligation’ are important because such stability enables 
continuation of interaction on the same basis. This in turn depends on continuing 
adherence by players to the mutually accepted rules of the game. Through the rules, 
all the other factors which make the game meaningful are brought together. For 
instance, there may be no motivation to participate, or participation might be ’an 
undesirable thing’, if all action within the game is arbitrary or random: "I’ll just have 
that pawn, and that knight" etc. It may indeed be impossible for a player to achieve 
any goals or to formulate strategies unless action is guided by rules which apply 
equally to each player. Ideally, then, the rules of the game should allow the complex 
sequence of actions which constitute ’playing the game’ to hang together in a rational 
manner according to a rational plan.
It can be seen therefore that although meaning is conceivable on several levels, the 
normative component of interaction is a crucial element since it has a bearing on 
meaning at every level: motivation to participate, pursuit of goals, formulation of 
strategies, and stability of conduct of the game. We should also note that the four 
examples of meaning given above (albeit important examples) do not by any means 
constitute an exhaustive list of meaningful categories.
Now, it is against this background of the imaginary interactional scenario of a game 
that Parsons defines the essential features of a stable system of interaction.
"A stable system of interaction, therefore, orients its participants in terms of
mutual expectations, which have the dual significance of expressing normative
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evaluations and stating contingent predictions of overt behavior. This mutuality 
of expectations implies that the evaluative meanings of acts are shared by the 
interacting units in two ways: what a member does can be categorized in terms 
meaningful to both; also, they share criteria of behavior, so that there are 
common standards of evaluation for particular acts."18
In the discussion to follow, we will consider some of the main implications of this 
definition. We begin then, with the expectational and obligational components of 
stable interaction. These components have a special significance since, as we shall 
later see, they have a hand in defining the theoretical basis of the conceptual apparatus 
of the jural relation.
III.2 Components of Stable Interaction
If, according to Parsons, a stable system of interaction "orients its participants in terms 
of mutual expectations" which are an expression of "normative evaluations", this 
suggests that each participant purposively orients his action towards the attainment of 
an end (at least partly) in terms of a subjective feeling of expectation which has been 
engendered by a social norm governing the action in question. It also suggests the 
normative component of obligation in terms of which, possibly in varying degrees of 
strength, it is felt something ought to be done, or a certain act ought to be performed. 
Clearly, shared expectations and mutually acknowledged obligations produce reliance 
among participants in the interaction process and heighten the probability of future 
conduct following the same pattern. The result of this is stability which in turn 
implies the possibility of repeatability. The existence of norms may therefore enhance 
one’s expectation that others may act in a particular manner. Recalling Weber’s 
remark:
"An important (but not indispensable) component of social action is its 
meaningful orientation to the expectation that others will act in a certain way,
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and to the presumable chances of success for one’s own action resulting 
therefrom."19
But the expectation of one participant relates to a course of action which is expected 
to be undertaken by the other participants. One cannot meaningfully ’expect* oneself 
to act in a particular way except in the loose sense of, e.g. "I expect I shall do this 
today".
The presence within Parsons’ stable system of interaction of ’expectations* which are 
mutual to the participants (each participant having an expectation of how the other 
participants should act) does not imply that each participant necessarily expects the 
others to act in the same way. The norms governing action in a given case specify the 
content of the action to be performed, and this may or may not be an identical type of 
action for each participant in the interaction process. The norm therefore is the 
determinant, or partial determinant, of the action that is expected of each participant.
In the same way, each participant also purposively orients his action towards the 
attainment of an end (at least partly) in terms of a subjective feeling of obligation 
engendered by a social norm governing the action in question. The subjective feeling 
of obligation which a participant has by virtue of the appropriate norm relates to the 
acting participant’s action. Thus each participant may experience in varying degrees 
of strength a feeling of obligation with respect to the action which he himself must 
undertake in the context of the interaction, in fulfilment o f  the expectations of others 
participating in the interaction process.
What this means is that if participant A has an expectation (justified by a norm) that 
participant B should 0, and participant B has an obligation to 0 in fulfilment of A’s 
expectation, the content of A’s expectation is equivalent to the content of B’s 
obligation, namely, that B should perform the act 0. This does not mean that A’s
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expectation is the same as B’s obligation, merely that in each case the content of the 
duty act is the same. This is precisely true of legal rights which are correlative to 
legal duties. As we have already seen, and as we shall consider in greater depth in 
chapter V, a legal right in the sociological sense according to Weber’s definition 
produces "an increase of the probability that a certain expectation of the one to whom 
the law grants the right will not be disappointed."20 A legal right inherent in one legal 
persona may have the same content as a legal duty (correlating with that right) 
incident to another legal persona, but this is not to say that the right and the duty are 
’the same thing’.21
In a system of co-operative social interaction where the normative basis of the 
interaction is likely to have been voluntarily assumed (and to that extent, the 
participants’ freedom voluntarily curtailed) there is perhaps a greater probability that 
the participants may actually experience immediate feelings of expectation or 
obligation, as appropriate. Furthermore, in that case the content of the expectation or 
obligation will probably be known, at least within reasonable limits, and interacting 
participants will therefore be aware of the nature of the act to be performed (e.g. the 
act of 0-ing).
However, in the legal domain where the normative basis of interaction is defined by 
legal rules, the individual may have little or no knowledge of the precise content of 
legal rights and legal duties, and may therefore have no accompanying feeling of 
expectation or obligation engendered by the rules. However, in a limited sense, the 
individual may recognise that his interaction with others is in some way governed by 
legal rules. In such a case, any accompanying feeling of obligation or expectation may 
arise from the acceptance of a general moral norm ’prescribing’ that whatever the law’s
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content is, in its particulars, the individual’s interaction ought to be governed by that.
In any case, as we shall see in chapter V, where legal rights and duties exist in given 
instances, there is often no question of their existing within the context of ’interaction’ 
in the Parsonian sense, they are simply ascribed upon the occurrence of certain 
’operative facts’. One reason for this is that legal rights and duties exist as much to 
govern the behaviour of courts and other ’coercive apparatuses’ as to govern the 
behaviour of those who ’have’ the rights and duties. The Parsonian system of 
interaction is nevertheless instructive if only to demonstrate hypothetically what the 
expectational and obligational feelings of an individual might in all probability be if 
the individual in question were fully knowledgeable of his legal position.
We should finally note the predictive aspect of a stable system of interaction. As we 
may recall, where a course of social action or interaction is ’stable’ each actor may, to 
a greater or lesser extent, orient his action by reference to his own prediction of the 
other actor’s probable responsive action, although such a prediction may or may not be 
well-founded. An actor’s previous knowledge of the predictable behaviour of another 
may furnish him with additional grounds for the expectation that a certain course of 
conduct will take place in the future. Certainly, the existence of norms will also help 
to reaffirm such an expectation. Hence, the mutual expectations of Parsons* stable 
system of interaction (to use Parsons* terminology) state "contingent predictions of 
overt behavior".
III.3 Functions of the Social Norm
In the last chapter we observed that one person can never have ’perfect’ knowledge of
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the mind of another person. This is true as a methodological principle in terms of the 
investigator’s limited ability to attain an understanding of the subjective meaning of 
the action of a given actor. But it is also true as a necessary feature of day to day 
human action and interaction. No-one can claim to act on the basis of ’perfect’ 
knowledge of the mind of another. But it can hardly be claimed that this constitutes 
an insuperable obstacle to the ordinary course of human interaction.
Indeed, for this reason it is essential to recognise that if an individual is a ’meaningful’ 
actor in the Weberian sense that motives, purposes, goals and essentially subjective 
states of mind lie behind his action, then he must also, and of course does, ascribe 
meaning to, and attempts to understand, the action of other individuals by reference to 
the same categories of meaning by which his own action is meaningful to him. It 
follows that if an individual in the course of acting socially in a subjectively 
meaningful manner and thus taking account of the behaviour of others ascribes 
meaning to the behaviour of others, such an ascription of meaning must be treated as 
a special case of ’taking account of the behaviour’ of others. The action to which 
meaning is thus ascribed may include action in the sense of both ’external’ acts and 
’external’ manifestations of mental content, both of which are, of course, ’external* 
acts in the wider sense.
The ascription of meaning by one individual (A) to the action of another individual 
(B) might include one of the following meaningful processes.
1. A attempts to understand B’s own intended meaning, by reference to which A 
orients his action accordingly.
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2. A ascribes a meaning o f his own making to B’s action. This may or may not 
coincide with B’s intended meaning, but serves A’s purposes, whatever they may 
be. Thus, A may be content to believe that B’s action has a meaning which is 
valid according to criteria of meaning applied by A, irrespective of whether it 
correctly apprehends B’s intended meaning.
An example of non-coincidence of meanings in the sense of 2 above is suggested by 
Weber when he refers to social relationships which are ’asymmetrical’. In such a case 
the parties associate different meanings with their actions and the social relationship is 
to that extent objectively ’asymmetrical’ from the point of view of the two parties. 
This may constitute ’mutual orientation’ in a special sense:
"It may nevertheless be a case of mutual orientation in so far as, even though 
partly or wholly erroneously one party presumes a particular attitude toward him 
on the part of the other and orients his action to this expectation.”22
If, however, recalling Weber, 23 an individual has difficulty even in knowing the 
content of the subjective meaning of his own action, he should in theory experience 
enormously greater difficulty in attaining an understanding of the meaning of the 
action of other interacting individuals. In practice, of course, interaction may often 
proceed with a tolerable degree of mutual understanding and this may allow 
interaction to be not only in some sense meaningful to the participants, but also 
reasonably functional in terms of serving the participants’ needs. At any rate, the 
shared linguistic conventions of language in human interaction often enable meaning to 
be conveyed with the least ambiguity.
Since social action may involve the actor himself in ascribing meaning to the 
behaviour of others, the task of sociology is to that extent more complicated. For in
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order to understand the action of actor A in terms of its subjective meaning, we may 
first have to understand the meaning which actor A in a given case ascribed to the 
behaviour of another actor, actor B. But, complicated or not, the focus of our 
attention would still be upon the subjective meaning of actor A ’s action (he being the 
object of our investigation), and part of this subjective meaning would be the meaning 
which he (actor A) placed on the action of actor B.
This should not be taken in any way to suggest that there are two ’types’ of subjective 
meaning involved in the sociological task in that case (i.e. the subjective meaning of 
actor A’s action and that of actor B’s action). Let us assume that the (Weberian) 
sociological task is directed towards attempting to penetrate the subjective meaning of 
action of a given actor whom we may call ’ego’. Thus, in so far as ego, the individual
under investigation, himself ascribes meaning to the action of another individual
(whom we may call ’alter’), the latter ascription of meaning becomes part of the 
subjective meaning of ego’s action, and is of interest for sociological purposes. We 
must assume that ego has oriented his action at least partly by reference to the 
meaning which he has ascribed to alter’s action.
The importance of this stance in the context of normative meaning can be seen if we 
turn our attention now towards a consideration of the principal functions of the social 
norm. On a narrower perspective, however, we should be aware that judicial social
action involves a judge in ascribing meaning to the action of litigants and other
interested parties. An understanding of the subjective meaning of the judge’s (’ego’s’) 
action, as we shall later find, is necessary for attaining an insight into the nature of 
the conceptual apparatus of the jural relation.
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For purposes of the present discussion, then, a social norm may be defined as a 
deontic proposition which functions as a reference point firstly for the evaluation, and 
secondly for the orientation of an individual’s own social action (e.g. that of ego). If, 
according to Weber, action is ’social’ in so far as by virtue of the subjective meaning 
attached to it by an actor (e.g ego) it takes account of the behaviour of others or 
another (e.g. alter) and is thereby oriented in its course, the taking account of alter’s 
behaviour may involve ego in ascribing evaluative meaning by virtue of the same or a 
different social norm to the behaviour of alter.
It follows that a third function of the social norm is as a reference point for the
evaluation by one individual (ego) of the behaviour of another individual (alter). But 
since an act of evaluation of this type is part of the subjective meaning of ego’s social 
action, in terms of which ego orients his own action, the use by ego of the social norm 
for the evaluation of alter’s behaviour is merely part of the ostensible function of the 
social norm as a reference point for the orientation of ego's social action. Here the act 
of ’orientation’ in question merely follows upon an act of ’evaluation’ of alter’s 
behaviour by reference to the appropriate social norm.
Arising from this, we can assert a fourth function of the social norm which is as a 
means of regulating the action (social or otherwise) of one individual (or plurality of 
individuals) in a question with, or in relation to, another individual (or plurality of 
individuals). This function is based on the recognition that the individual in
evaluating and orienting his social action by reference to a social norm takes account
of the behaviour of ’others’ in the sense either that he expects ’another’ to act in the 
manner prescribed by the norm or that he feels obliged himself to act in that manner 
in fulfilment of the expectation of ’another’. The regulative function is also based on
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the recognition that when action is so oriented, it is social action at least in a broad 
sense that it involves the individual in taking account of the behaviour of others by 
acknowledging the normativity of the social environment which consists of 
innumerable ’others’ who both promulgate and also evaluate and orient their social 
action by reference to social norms.
Some observations will now be made in order to clarify certain aspects of this 
suggested outline of the principal functions of the social norm.
When it is said that a norm functions ’as a reference point’ this means that the norm is 
referred to as an idea: a motivating normative idea embodying the notion of ’ought’ 
(or ’shall’ or ’must’) in relation to human action. A norm does not in any sense 
physically enact human action. It is a proposition embodying ideas which motivate 
action. Hence the term ’reference point’ means simply that norms are propositions 
which are referred to for the purpose of evaluating and orienting human action.
A social norm may in any given case constitute only one motivating idea within the 
complex of ideas which constitute the subjective meaning of the action in question. In 
such a case, if an actor has in fact oriented his action by reference to a social norm, 
his action may be understood as having been at least partly motivated by the norm. 
We should note that the orientation by an individual of his action by reference to a 
social norm does not necessarily imply compliant orientation in the sense that the 
individual attempts to make his action conform to the prescription contained in the 
norm. Orientation by reference to a norm may be compliant or non-compliant 
orientation in that the norm may constitute a reason for acting in some way other than 
that prescribed by the norm. For example, a legal norm may provoke civil
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disobedience, or, as Weber appropriately remarks,
"A thief orients his action to the validity of the criminal law in that he acts 
surreptitiously. The fact that the order is recognized as valid in his society is 
made evident by the fact that he cannot violate it openly without punishment.H24
According to the preceding discussion, one of the functions of a social norm is as a 
reference point for the evaluation by an individual (e.g. ego) of his own social action. 
According to this ego in acting socially (and therefore in taking account of the 
behaviour of others, e.g. alter) may, for example, act socially by evaluating his own 
action in terms of whether he is under an obligation (or actually feels obliged) to 0 in 
fulfilment of alter’s actual or presumed expectation that he (ego) should 0.
Another function of the social norm is as a reference point for the evaluation by ego 
of alter’s behaviour (i.e. action, whether social or otherwise) according to which ego 
may, for example, evaluate alter’s behaviour in terms of whether or not alter has 
complied with an obligation imposed by a social norm. (In such a case the obligation 
in question may be owed by alter to anyone, including ego.)
In each case, the act of evaluation involves the actor in a purely mental judgmental act 
consisting of a mental ’calculation’ about the applicability or non-applicability (and the 
manner, incidence, method or appropriateness etc. of applicability or 
non-applicability) of a social norm with respect to behaviour in a given case. As we 
shall see, ’orientation’ (by reference to a social norm) differs from this in that 
orientation should be seen as the result or outcome of a process that involves an act of 
evaluation. The point is that orientation involves a conscious alteration (or adjustment 
or re-adjustment) of behaviour which consists of an effort of will to ’produce’ 
’external’ acts, which induce or bring about (according to von Wright’s analysis25^  a
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perceptible ’change* in the ’real world.’
An act of evaluation is probably of sociological interest only in so far as it leads to the 
orientation of action, even if the orientation in question is only a manifestation of the 
content of the evaluative act, for example a verbal utterance that a given act complies 
with a social norm, or something beyond this, such as verbal criticism for the supposed 
contravention of a norm.
For present purposes, an act of evaluation may involve a judgment that a given action, 
whether past, present or future (future action being hypothetical) complies with or is 
in conformity with the prescription contained in a social norm. The evaluative 
judgment in question may relate either to ego’s judgment in relation to his own past, 
present or future action, or ego’s judgment in relation to alter’s past, present or future 
action.
Evaluative judgments may be of various kinds and are by no means restricted to 
uncomplicated judgments of whether an act complies with a given norm. In fact a 
judgment of compliance or non-compliance is relatively uncomplicated. Conceptually 
more complex judgments may include (for example) whether an act is intra vires or 
ultra vires relative to a power; whether a deed is valid or invalid relative to conditions 
for the recognition of the deed; whether someone has ’capacity’ to act in a certain 
way; and whether an argument is within or outside the scope of a doctrine. More 
concrete examples are, of course,to be found in a specifically legal context.
If the act of evaluation is a purely mental judgmental act, the act of orientation by 
contrast, as we suggested above, involves both a ’mental’ aspect being the purposive or
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conscious mental effort to change or direct one’s action in a certain way, often 
following upon an act of evaluation in the sense described, and also an overt or 
’externally’ perceptible action which is the realisation (whether successful or 
unsuccessful) of the mental effort. Here the overt action consists of muscular 
movement of some sort. No attempt will be made here to elaborate upon the idea of a 
’mental effort’ in terms, for example, of conscious or unconscious motivations of the 
type expounded in psychological theory. For present purposes we should simply 
accept a (hopefully not too misleading) commonsense notion of ’mental effort’ in the 
hope that this will serve in some way to assist us to understand the orientative 
function of social norms.
The orientation by an individual of his action by reference to a social norm may be 
preceded by one or more acts of evaluation which constitute a basis for the acts of 
orientation. If the norm in question is ’internalised* in the sense of Simmel’s 
analysis, 26 there may be no conscious evaluative act, the action in question being in 
some sense habitual.
Accepting, then, that an act of evaluation (by reference to a social norm) may precede 
an act of orientation (by reference to the same or different social norms), it may be 
helpful to identify three modes of evaluation which constitute a basis for the 
orientation by ego of his action.
1. Evaluation by ego of ego’s own action by reference to a social norm (e.g. social 
norm x).
2. Evaluation by ego of alter's action by reference to a social norm (e.g. social
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norm y).
3. Evaluation by ego of ego’s own action by reference to a social norm and 
evaluation by ego of alter’s action by reference to a social norm (e.g. either 
social norm x or social norm y).
This third mode of evaluation combines the first two modes, and each should be 
understood to constitute a basis for the orientation of ego's social action, in the sense 
of forming part of the subjective meaning of his action.
To make matters more concrete, we will consider an example of the mode of 
evaluation which combines the first and second modes (i.e. the third mode). For 
purposes of our example, the object of our investigation is the action of Hamlet (ego). 
We may assume the example to be valid regardless of the justification for the existence 
of norms x and y used in the example, whether moral, legal or otherwise.
According to our example then, in terms of norm x Hamlet is under a duty in a 
question with Rosencrantz (alter 1) to punish anyone who fails to comply with norm y, 
and Rosencrantz has a right in a question with Hamlet that Hamlet should so punish 
anyone.
In terms of norm y, Guildenstern (alter 2) is under a duty in a question with 
Rosencrantz to sweep the floor, and Rosencrantz has a right in a question with 
Guildenstern that Guildenstern should sweep the floor.
As it happens, for purposes of the example, Guildenstern fails to sweep the floor. In
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this case Hamlet may orient his action on the basis of the following acts of evaluation, 
which are, of course, by no means exhaustive of possible acts of evaluation by 
reference to norms x and y. In the first place there is the act of evaluation involved 
in conceiving of Guildenstern’s failure to sweep the floor as a ’contravention* of, or 
failure to comply with, norm y. Here ego (Hamlet) uses norm y as a reference point 
for the evaluation of the behaviour of alter 2 (Guildenstern).
In the second place, there is the act of evaluation involved in Hamlet’s conceiving of 
his own intended future action (i.e, whether or not to punish Rosencrantz at some 
future time) as complying with (or failing to comply with) norm x. Here ego (Hamlet) 
uses norm x as a reference point for the evaluation of his own (intended) social action. 
Such action is ’social* to the extent that it takes account of: (1) alter 1 simpliciter or (2) 
alter l ’s behaviour in the sense of his supposed probable expectation that ego should 
comply with norm x, or (3) alter l ’s behaviour in the sense of his probable responsive 
action should ego fail to comply with norm x (e.g. criticism) and so on.
If Hamlet punishes Guildenstern, then in Weberian terms the subjective meaning of his 
action is accountable in part to Hamlet’s decision to orient his action by reference to 
norm x and norm y. This would involve firstly, separate acts of evaluation by 
reference respectively to norm x and norm y as described above, and secondly, an act 
of compliance with norm x. By so orienting his action, Hamlet also acts socially since 
by virtue of the subjective meaning of his action he takes account of the behaviour of 
others. On the one hand he ascribes evaluative normative meaning to the behaviour of 
Guildenstern (alter 2), and on the other hand he takes account of the behaviour (or 
probable behaviour) of Rosencrantz (alter 1) in any of the senses, which are by no 
means exhaustive, mentioned above.
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In summary, then, orientation involves a conscious alteration or adjustment of action, 
and where orientation is by reference to a social norm, the norm may be said to 
constitute part of the subjective meaning of the resultant action. In terms of a purely 
empirical causal analysis, as we suggested earlier, the investigator (without conferring 
’meaning* on action as manifested by, for example, words or gestures) may note the 
constant conjunction or regular sequence of ’events* in the sense that one event (e.g. 
Hamlet’s asserting: *1 propose to punish Guildenstern in compliance with norm x’) is 
invariably followed by another event (e.g. Hamlet’s striking Guildenstern on the jaw). 
This ’meaning-impoverished’ sequence of events may then be ascribed meaning in 
accordance with Weber’s methodological requirement.
As we have found, one of the functions of the social norm is as a means of regulating 
the action (social or otherwise) of one individual (or plurality of individuals) in a 
question with, or in relation to, another individual (or plurality of individuals).
The regulative function of the social norm, as suggested earlier, arises from the 
recognition that the individual does in fact evaluate and orient his social action by 
reference to social norms, and also orients his action by reference to the evaluative 
normative meaning ascribed by him to the action of others. It follows that social 
norms may be used as a means of inducing individuals so to orient their social action 
and may often be used in combination with other types of inducement (e.g. physical 
or psychological coercion).
The regulative function is comprehensible in terms of the objectives which the 
regulation is intended to secure. If individuals voluntarily subject their intended
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interaction to governance by social norms this self-imposed curtailment of freedom 
may be understood in terms of the specific individual or collective goals which the 
interacting participants wish to achieve. For example Parsons* chess game scenario 
assumes that both players have either overtly or by implication agreed to be bound by 
the rules in that they orient their actions, wholly or partly, by reference to the rules.
Meaningful interaction is expressed through the objects which the game is designed to 
secure, and any other ends which the players personally find to be secured by the 
game as such. For players, the voluntary ’giving up’ of freedom by the imposition on 
their interaction of rules in a sense allows the players ’freedom’ to interact 
meaningfully towards a shared pursuit. In the case of chess the competitive element is 
expressed, by virtue of the rules, through the medium of the playing apparatus of the 
game. As John Finnis appropriately remarks,
"The third basic aspect of human well-being is play. ... each one of us can see 
the point of engaging in performances which have no point beyond the 
performance itself, enjoyed for its own sake. The performance may be solitary 
or social, intellectual or physical, strenuous or relaxed, highly structured or 
relatively informal...27
In the same way, when parties enter into a contract they subject their action to 
governance by norms in order to achieve certain ends which are considered useful or 
desirable. But the voluntary subjection of action to regulation by social norms is by 
no means the most typical manifestation of the regulative function. Regulation may 
be imposed through relationships of authority, both legitimate and illegitimate, and 
may indeed weigh against the will of those upon whom it is imposed. In this context, 
the nature of the authority relationship may enable us to understand the nature of the 
regulation involved. Regulation, then, may facilitate interactional stability (among 
those regulated) or may assist in the resolution of confrontational interaction or allow
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societal objectives to be achieved.
But on the other hand regulation within an authority relationship may secure 
repression of a minority (or less powerful) group, or facilitate the exploitation of one 
sector of society to the advantage of another sector. Clearly, an understanding of the 
nature and effects of regulation must proceed from a consideration of the 
consequences of regulation as experienced by those subject to it, and also those who 
’do the subjecting’. The ’true’ nature of a repressive authority relationship (especially 
legal authority) may be revealed in the content of the ’repressive’ legal norms. The 
norms in question may serve as a reference point for the orientation of official action 
in terms of being primarily directed towards exacting sanctions against (e.g.) a 
minority group. We may find that in such a case it is merely a secondary function of 
the legal norms promulgated by the authority to regulate the action of the minority 
group, especially if the norms in question are in some sense morally repugnant to that 
group. To that extent, legal repression may also be understood in terms of its ability 
to secure the continued existence of a political power group and to facilitate the 
suppression of political dissent.
More generally, when we assert that a social norm regulates the action of one or more 
individuals in a question with or in relation to one or more other individuals, this 
acknowledges the necessary and inherent relationality of human social action. The 
regulative function of the social norm assumes that ego acts socially. Ego, therefore, 
by virtue of the subjective meaning of his action, takes account of alter or the 
behaviour of alter in orienting his action by reference to the social norm. What this 
means, more concretely, is that, adopting ego’s point of view, if the social norm is to 
be intelligible in a social context in which ’egos’ in acting socially take account of
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’alters* or the behaviour of ’alters’, it seems to follow that the social norm must reflect 
this relationality by embodying an ’oughtness* with respect either to the action of ego 
or the action of alter in relation to the alter with respect to whom ego is acting 
socially.
In terms of the present analysis, this relationality is inherent in the structure of a 
social norm, and any norm which does not possess this structure cannot intelligibly be 
a social norm. So unless a social norm functions in some way to regulate the action of 
one person in a question with one or more other persons or is at least capable of 
fulfilling this function by virtue of its structure, it cannot be a social norm.
Thus, if ego is acting socially and making reference to a social norm in so acting, he 
(ego) may consider (by reason of the social norm in its application to his situation or 
that of others) either (1) that he (ego) ought to act in manner 0 in a question with 
alter, or (2) that alter ought to act in manner 0 in a question with him (ego), or (3) 
that alter 1 ought to act in manner 0 in a question with alter 2, and so on. But the 
social norm is only intelligible as a social norm in a context in which one person ought 
to act in a particular manner with respect to other persons, for if we imagine a norm 
existing in a social vacuum (for example, ego has a duty which does not avail against 
anyone at all) such a duty is not intelligible as a social duty because the person of 
inherence (i.e. the person having an expectation or right) must be at the same time 
the person of incidence (i.e. the person having an obligation or duty).
Such a norm may of course, be intelligible as a precept embodying a subjectively 
prudential course of action, possibly valid only to the person to whom the norm 
applies. Norms having a strictly religious derivation (for example, those governing
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acts of thought) may, in a secularist and a-metaphysical sense, even if they do not 
involve social action in the sense of the present analysis, involve a relationship of a 
kind similar to a social relationship in which God is conceived in anthropomorphic 
terms. This seems especially true of those acts of thought which, according to St. 
Thomas Aquinas, constitute sins of thought.28
This seems a convenient point, then, to conclude our observations on the principal 
functions of the social norm. In the next part of this chapter we consider the notion 
of normative meaning as a basis for discussion in chapter IV of legal meaning.
III.4 Normative Meaning
Normative meaning has special significance in the present context not only because in 
purely theoretical terms it may be considered part of the broader Weberian notion of 
subjective meaning, but because by any view of social reality individuals do in fact 
orient their social action by reference to social norms in terms of which their action is 
at least in part meaningful to them. As we have seen, such meaningful orientation 
may follow upon purely mental evaluative acts consisting in the ascription of 
evaluative normative meaning (by ego) either to (1) ego’s own past, present or 
(hypothetical) future action, or (2) the past, present or (hypothetical) future action of 
alter, or (3) a combination of ego’s own, and alter’s, past, present and (hypothetical) 
future action.
It is convenient to return to Parsons’ model of stable interaction to consider normative 
meaning in that context. We may recall that according to Parsons the mutuality of
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expectations (and presumably also the mutuality of obligations) arising from adherence 
to social norms, e.g. the rules of chess, "implies that the evaluative meanings of acts 
are shared by the interacting units in two ways: what a member does can be 
categorized in terms meaningful to both; ... [and] there are common standards of 
evaluation for particular acts."29 It can now be seen that in order to attain an 
understanding of the actions of each player, the investigator must attempt to grasp the 
sense in which the subjective evaluative (and orientative) meanings of one player’s 
actions are shared with those of the other player. The fact of the matter, as we 
observed earlier, is that both players overtly or by implication agree to subject their 
actions to governance in terms of the rules of the game. It follows that their actions 
then become meaningful by reference to those rules in terms of what a player may or 
may not do in a question with the other player and in terms of whether a particular 
action on the part of one player counts as a basis for a given responsive action by the 
other player. This process may continue successively and sequentially, according to 
the rules, until the game ends. Furthermore, the normative basis of interaction should 
be clear at the outset to both players.
Thus if one player (e.g. Rosencrantz) ’takes* another player’s (e.g. Guildenstern’s) 
bishop, this will be interpreted not as an attempt to disestablish the Church nor to 
interfere with the Lords Spiritual in their legislative endeavours, but as something 
meaningful not only in terms of the rules of the game, but also in terms of the 
internal logic of the strategic potential of the game. At this point we should note what 
is perhaps inordinately obvious: that the rules of chess govern how players are to move 
the playing-pieces and not how the playing-pieces themselves ’move’. It is however 
certainly true to a degree that the rules ’attach’ in some way to the playing-pieces, for 
example, in the sense that the bishop may be thought of as a playing-piece which may
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only move diagonally, and so on. Here we attribute the property of diagonal 
movement to the bishop rather than to a player. But the principal function of the 
rules is to regulate the action of players with respect to one another, and therefore the 
rules define that players may only move the bishop diagonally. Looked at this way, 
the rules define what players do, not what ’bishops’ do.
Now because the players share the same normative definition of the situation the 
categorisation of the actions of each player is, according to Parsons, in terms 
meaningful to both players. The tendency to ’categorise’ action suggests that in a 
sense meaning ’attaches’ to action by virtue of the rules in that an action may be 
treated (as regards any player with respect either to his own or the other player’s 
action) as falling into any of the following categories, which are not exhaustive: (1) a 
compliant action (i.e. one that complies with a prescription), (2) a non-compliant 
action (i.e. one that contravenes a prescription), (3) a ’dubious’ action (e.g. one that is 
difficult to categorise either because there is doubt about the meaning of the rules 
themselves, or because there is doubt about whether the action in question is within 
the scope of a prescription), and (4) an ’irrelevant’ action (e.g. Rosencrantz makes 
some coffee during the game. An unreasonable delay, however, may be capable of 
categorisation under a different head).
Turning our attention to compliant and non-compliant action, if in compliance with 
the rules Rosencrantz executes a two-square lateral movement of his rook, this may be 
interpreted by both Rosencrantz and Guildenstern as a ’lawful’ move and will, in 
accordance with the rules, constitute a basis for Guildenstern thereupon to orient his 
action in response by executing an appropriate move of his own making. In so doing, 
Guildenstern orients his responsive action partly by reference to the meaning which he
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has ascribed to Rosencrantz’s move which Guildenstern, in deeming the move ’lawful’ 
considers to be a (partial) basis for his responsive action.
If however, in response, Guildenstern executes a five-square lateral (not diagonal) 
movement of his bishop, this may be interpreted by Rosencrantz (and possibly also 
Guildenstern) as an ’unlawful* move and may also constitute a basis this time for 
Rosencrantz to orient his action in response, but not necessarily to execute a move as 
such. More likely, Rosencrantz will point out to Guildenstern that he has made an 
unlawful move and the process of interaction, possibly itself normatively oriented, may 
continue with a view to resolving the matter of Guildenstern’s unlawful move. At this 
stage it might be said that in so far as interaction had until then been constituted by 
the playing of the game of chess according to the rules, interactional stability (in 
Parsons* sense) may be jeopardised by Guildenstern’s unlawful move (so far as 
continuation of the game is concerned) because there is a possibility that the normative 
meanings of actions are not actually shared by the players. For example, Guildenstern 
may ’erroneously’ (i.e. relative to, say, an ’authoritative’30 statement of the rules) 
believe that a player may lawfully execute any of the following moves with his bishop, 
all of which might be consistent with Guildenstern’s unlawful move: (1) lateral 
movement only; or (2) lateral and diagonal movement; or (3) lateral movement, 
provided the movement extends to (a) not less than three, or (b) not less than four, or 
(c) not less than five, squares; or (4) lateral movement if and only if diagonal 
movement is otherwise impossible, and so on.
’Interaction’ in the sense of playing the game of chess may become unstable by virtue 
of this presumed failure to share the normative meanings of actions and may in 
consequence break down completely. Alternatively the players may have to redefine
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the basis of interaction so that both players eventually agree upon a basis for the 
movement of the bishop. Indeed Guildenstern’s unlawful move may be given a more 
’sinister* interpretation.
There may in fact be no failure in terms of authoritative meanings of actions in that 
both Rosencrantz and Guildenstern know the rules or share a knowledge of at least 
one version of the rules which is the agreed basis for play. The point is that 
Guildenstern may be cheating and, like Weber’s surreptitious thief, may attempt to 
gain an advantage over Rosencrantz while he is making the coffee. Here, 
Guildenstern still orients his action by reference to the rules of chess, but the rules in 
this situation are not sufficient to enable us to understand Guildenstern’s 
(surreptitious) action. Here we have to have knowledge of the (uniquely?) human 
attribute of dishonesty.
The point here is that deliberate contravention of the rules in order to gain an unfair 
advantage has a meaning which is somehow extrinsic to the rules as such, and lies 
more appropriately in the moral realm. Morality may indeed determine the content of 
specific rules, such as for example, a rule prohibiting cheating. Moreover, much of 
the conduct of the game, whether in terms of the content of specific rules or 
otherwise, may only be truly meaningful because of an unfathomable background of 
unstated moral assumptions shared by the interacting participants. In that sense 
Guildenstern’s surreptitious move may have a meaning (in morality) shared by both 
players by which they acknowledge that cheating is wrong, and therefore that a 
cheating move is wrong.
In this situation, clearly the evaluative meaning of actions is shared by the
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participants. Hence we must modify Parsons’ implied assertion that stability of 
interaction somehow arises from the mere sharing of evaluative meanings. 
Interactional stability arises not only from a sharing of evaluative, and therefore 
expectational and obligational, meanings, but also adherence to the rules of the game, 
or the rules governing any interaction.
It is convenient to conclude this discussion of normative meaning by suggesting a route 
that leads to the notion of legal meaning. Legal meaning should be understood as an 
unique type of normative meaning which depends analytically on two special features 
which are not exemplified in the Parsonian model of stable interaction. Legal meaning 
arises in the context of rules which govern interaction of a distinct type.
The first distinguishing feature of legal meaning presupposes that ’law’ assumes an 
institutional form in the sense of Weber’s category of ’guaranteed law’31 in which a 
’coercive apparatus’ either possesses or responds to an adjudicatory function. Hence, 
law in its institutional form presupposes the existence of a legal institution or system 
of legal institutions32 i.e. courts and tribunals, one of whose principal functions is to 
’adjudicate’ upon the action of litigants or other individuals with a view ultimately to 
the mobilisation of a specifically coercive (in the sense of sanction-exacting) 
institutional apparatus. In this sense the adjudicatory function could be conceived in 
simple terms if we inserted an umpire into the Parsonian model and considered the 
function which the umpire fulfils in that context. Briefly, the umpire does not ’do’ 
what the players ’do’, i.e. play the game. His function is basically that of making an 
authoritative judgment about the meaning of the actions of the players by reference to 
the rules of the game, and of the meaning of the rules of the game in their application 
to the actions of the players, usually in the event of a dispute between the players as
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to the normative meaning of players’ actions, or the meaning of rules in their 
application to the players’ actions.
In this situation, drawing on the preceding analysis, the umpire’s social action in 
umpiring the game, is meaningfully oriented, but not by any means exhaustively 
oriented, in terms of: (1) the meaning of his own social action evaluated by reference 
to social norms which define his adjudicatory role in a question with ’others’ who may 
include (a) only the players, or (b) persons other than the players (e.g. an ’authority’ 
of some sort), or (c) a combination of the persons in the two preceding categories, and 
possibly (d) others beyond that; and (2) the meaning of his own social action, i.e. his 
decision or adjudication relative to the players’ action, based on the evaluative 
meaning which he has ascribed to the action o f the players, that is, the action of each 
player with respect to the other evaluated in terms of the rules of the game.
The umpire’s ascription of evaluative normative meaning to the players’ action by 
reference to the rules of the game may differ completely from the evaluative 
normative meaning which each player, by reference to the rules of the game, ascribes 
not only to his own action but to the action of the other player with a view to the 
orientation of his own action.
Whether the umpire takes account, or is under an obligation to take account, of the 
meaning of the players’ actions as conceived from their distinct points of view depends 
on the umpire’s adjudicatory function as determined by the relationships between the 
umpire and each player as defined by social norms. The norms in question also 
govern how the players themselves act following an authoritative ruling by the umpire.
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The second distinguishing feature of legal meaning arises from the recognition that the 
adjudicatory function involves relationships whose content is at least partly defined by 
social norms. In fact this assertion is simply a particular manifestation of a more 
general assumption that social action is definitionally, necessarily and inherently 
relational. This relationality is expressed not only in the subjective meaning of social 
action as such, but is reflected in the structure of the social norm.
In the example given, the normative (or ’normatised’) social relationship obtaining 
between one player and the other player differs from that between the umpire and 
each player simply because the umpire is involved in an activity which, though it 
relates to the conduct of the game as between the players, differs completely from the 
activity in which the players are involved, i.e. playing the game. Nonetheless, the 
content of the player-player relationship may depend on the content of the 
umpire-player relationships, for example, in terms of the umpire’s power, if any, to 
make a ruling accepted by the players as binding in relation to the conduct of the 
game.
It follows that in similar fashion the content of the umpire-player relationships as 
regards the umpire’s role in relation to the conduct of the game must be determined in 
some way by the player-player relationship, as defined by the rules of the game. 
Clearly any ruling which the umpire makes concerns the normative meaning of the 
player’s action or the meaning of the rules of the game in their application to the 
players’ action. This will depend on the relationship between the players as defined 
by the rules of the game.
It will be recalled that a similar kind of interdependence of relationships was
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encountered in an earlier example33 in terms of which Hamlet had a duty in a question 
with Rosencrantz (according to norm x) to punish anyone failing to comply with norm 
y (which imposed a duty on Guildenstern in a question with Rosencrantz to sweep the 
floor). Here norm x determines the content of the normative social relationship 
obtaining between Hamlet and Rosencrantz, while norm y determines the content of 
the normative social relationship obtaining between Guildenstern and Rosencrantz. 
But the relationships in question are linked because the norms are linked contentually 
in the manner described.
In essence, this interdependence of normative social relationships is to be found in the 
legal context within the adjudication process and, as might be expected, this has 
implications for the process of ascribing legal meaning to human action or other ’facts’ 
for legal purposes, whether in the narrower context of adjudication or in the wider 
context of the mobilisation of a legal ’coercive apparatus’. But we will give further 
consideration to interdependence later in this chapter.
Throughout the preceding discussion we have adverted to the importance of the 
relationality of human social action and it is now appropriate to consider relationality 
as a preliminary to the discussion, in the next chapter, of legal meaning.
III.5 The Relationality of Social Action
It might be argued, in the sense of the preceding discussion, that social action is 
relational in that it is in some sense intelligible for a ’meaningful actor’ to conceive an 
ideative linkage or imaginative connection between certain objects of cognition, or
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ideas, by virtue of some common property which is found either to inhere in, or to 
attach to, those objects or ideas.
In the context of social action, following Weber’s definition of social action, the 
’objects* or ’ideas* might be said to correspond, on the one hand, to the subjectively 
meaningful social behaviour or action of the ’self (i.e. ego: the actor who is involved 
in meaningful social activity), and on the other hand, to an actor other than the ’self* 
(i.e. alter) or to the behaviour or action of that actor, who, or whose behaviour, is 
’taken account o r  by ego. Ego’s act of contemplating or of taking account of alter (or 
of alter’s behaviour) may, from ego’s point of view, in itself constitute sufficient 
imaginative connection to enable the existence of a ’relationship* between himself (ego) 
and alter to be acknowledged. But a mere act of thought on the part of one actor is 
probably insufficient to enable the investigator to assert the existence of a social 
relationship, because, according to Weber’s definition, the social relationship consists in 
"the behaviour of a plurality of actors in so far as, in its meaningful content, the 
action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms".34 It 
will be recalled that Weber added a further requirement: "that there should be at least 
a minimum of mutual orientation of the action of each to that of the others".35
The relationship, then, so far as social, might be said to be constituted, firstly, by acts 
of thought by which an imaginative connection is made by an actor (as part of the 
’subjective meaning* of his action) by reference to a ’content’ which is the common 
property or linking medium, and secondly, by the corresponding orientation of the 
action of each to that of others. The common property or linking medium which is 
the ’content’ of the relationship may be said to consist, correspondingly, of, firstly, the 
’ideas’ which govern the meaningful content of the relationship, for example, ties of
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mutual affection, friendship, a common purpose, natural (family) connections, 
religious belief, a conflict of interests or confrontation; and secondly, the overt action, 
perceived by the interacting participants to be more or less oriented by reference to 
the relevant ideative content.
The perception by participants of the appropriate action may constitute part of what 
links the participants ideatively, either in the sense of ’confirming’ an existing linking 
medium which constitutes the meaningful basis of their action (e.g. mutual affection, 
etc.), or in the sense that since each participant is experiencing to a greater or lesser 
extent the overt behaviour of every other participant, this, in a minimal sense, links 
the participants in a shared experience of ’external* events.
In this latter sense mere overt action could in itself constitute the common property or 
linking medium which might enable an actor to assert the existence of a ’relationship*, 
but it is doubtful whether this would constitute a Weberian social relationship.
A social relationship might be said to be constituted by a course of social action in 
which each actor acts with respect to other actors, and therefore takes account of the 
other actors or their behaviour, by making reference, among other things, to some 
acknowledged common property or linking medium. From ego’s point of view the 
relationality of his social action lies in the subjective meaning of his action by virtue 
of which, in taking account of alter or of the behaviour of alter, he conceives of his 
action in relational terms by reference to the appropriate linking medium, whatever its 
content may be. This linking medium may be found to be inter subjectively valid: i.e. 
taking successively each and every participant in the interaction process, and treating 
him as ’ego’, we may find that the property which links the participants is shared in
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some way, to a greater or lesser extent.
Now, as we observed earlier, where a social norm exists, and is empirically valid in 
the Weberian sense, 86 then social action which is meaningfully evaluated and oriented 
by reference to the norm may also be relational in the sense that the norm functions, 
by virtue of the subjective meaning of the action in question, as at least one linking 
medium, that is, a medium by which ego’s past, present or (hypothetical) future action 
may be normatively linked with the past, present or (hypothetical) future action of 
alter. In similar fashion, ego may use the norm as a medium by which alter l ’s past, 
present or (hypothetical) future action may be normatively linked with alter 2’s past, 
present or (hypothetical) future action, for example where the norm is used as a 
reference point for the evaluation by ego of the action of alter 1 and alter 2 with a 
view to the orientation by ego of his own action.
In order to be clear just how the social norm operates as a medium of relationality we 
will consider a suggested scheme of structural elements of the right-duty social norm 
which itself reflects the relationality of social action. By looking at the social norm as 
a medium of relationality we may hopefully discover what elements are ’linked’ or 
’connected’, by means of the social norm.
Based loosely on two separate analyses, that of J.W. Harris, 37 and that of John 
Finnis, 88 the following structural elements of a typical social norm might be 
identified. These structural elements should not be treated as being exhaustive since 
there are many types of social norms serving manifestly different functions: -
1. identification criteria of persons of inherence: i.e. those having an ’expectation’
109
or ’right’ that other persons should act in a prescribed manner;
2. identification criteria of persons of incidence: i.e. those having an ’obligation’
or a ’duty* to act in a prescribed manner;
3. deontic operator (e.g. ’shall’, ’will’, ’may*, ’ought’, ’should’, etc.); and
4. description of an act, act-situation, action or course of action prescribed as
being the subject of the obligation or duty.
It is not suggested that any given formulation of a social norm will on the face of it 
contain all these elements together, for it takes little effort to imagine social norms of 
the form: ’A has a duty to 0’, or *A has a right to 0’, or *A has a right to that book* or 
’one ought to 0’. In the case of each formulation the social dimension of what are 
supposedly social norms is concealed precisely because there may be uncertainty as to 
the identity of the person or persons whom A in acting socially is taking, or ought to 
take, account of in so acting, or as to the nature of the behaviour of such person or 
persons which A is taking, or ought to take, account of in acting socially.
Hence ’A has a duty to 0’ does not seem intelligible in a social context unless we 
receive an answer to questions such as: ’to whom does A owe this duty?’ or ’whom 
does A have in mind, or whose expected future behaviour does A take account of if, 
in acting socially, he 0’s?’. We can attempt to answer these questions by reformulating 
the norm *A has a duty to 0’ as (e.g.): ’A has a duty to 0 in a question with B’.
Since this implies firstly that B has a right that A should 0 in order to fulfil both A’s
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duty (or obligation) and B’s right (or expectation), and secondly, that owing to A’s 
having the appropriate duty it may be said (regardless of any higher justification) that 
A ’ought to’ or ’should’ or ’must’ 0 in a question with B, we might then assert that the 
structural elements described are found in the social norm in the example in the sense 
that (1) A is identified as the person of incidence, (2) B is identified as the person of 
inherence, (3) there is, or is implied, a deontic operator, and (4) act 0 is identified as 
the act which is subject to the duty or obligation.
If we reformulate a right-duty (or expectation-obligation) social norm into minimal 
structural elements which accentuate the social context in which such norms are 
intelligible as social norms, this should presumably afford a basis for comprehending 
the nature of the relationality of the social action regulated by the norm. To that end, 
it is important to consider the way in which actors whose action is governed by a 
social norm conceive of their action in relational terms by virtue of the norm. Social 
norms may then be seen as a medium of relationality, that is, a medium by which the 
participant actors’ action is normatively linked.
Using our earlier example, let us imagine that Guildenstern has a duty in a question 
with Rosencrantz to sweep the floor. The norm might be in the following terms: 
’Guildenstern shall sweep the floor, if so requested by Rosencrantz’. The four 
structural elements of the norm are explicitly present here, although the norm only 
implies the person of inherence (Rosencrantz) because Guildenstern may owe the duty 
to someone other than Rosencrantz, the point being that Rosencrantz may simply be 
the person appointed to ’do the requesting’. But anyhow, we assume Rosencrantz to be 
the person of inherence.
I l l
Let us also imagine that the norm is empirically valid for both Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern, in the sense that they accept it as governing their relationship. Thus, it 
is treated, firstly, as regulating Guildenstern’s action in a question with Rosencrantz, 
secondly, as a reference point for the evaluation and orientation by Guildenstern of his 
own social action and also as a basis for the orientation of the action of Rosencrantz, 
if, for example, Guildenstern should fail to sweep the floor, and thirdly as a means by 
which evaluative and orientative normative meaning may be ascribed by each 
participant to his own action and to the action of the other participant.
Now if we are to understand the sense in which the social norm defines a relationship 
between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern we need only identify as one of the ’common 
properties’ which thus link them, the social norm. In this way an ideative linkage or 
imaginative connection is conceived between past, present or (hypothetical) future 
action.
According to David Hume, a relation exists when two ideas are connected together in 
the imagination and a comparison is drawn between them. Hume calls this a 
’philosophical relation’.89 The connecting principles may include resemblance or 
similarity, identity or quality. In a situation where two parties subject their 
interaction to governance by a mutually acknowledged social norm, the connecting 
principle of identity seems to be present at a number of levels which in many ways 
correspond to the structural elements of the social norm. To be more concrete, and in 
terms of the example, identity is present on the following suggested levels.
First, there is identity, adopting the point of view either of Rosencrantz or of 
Guildenstern, in the sense that each recognises that Rosencrantz’s expectation (or right)
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and Guildenstern’s obligation (or duty) both relate to the same subject matter which is 
the act to be performed by Guildenstern, the act of sweeping the floor.
Second, again adopting either viewpoint, each is presumed to recognise that the act in 
question (sweeping the floor) is to be performed by the same person: Guildenstern.
Third, again adopting either viewpoint, each is presumed to know who are involved in 
this process in the sense that each knows the identity of his ’opposite number’. (Ego 
knows that both ego and alter are involved in this process).
Fourth, again adopting either viewpoint, each is presumed to know that the same norm 
governs their conduct and that there is identity to a greater or lesser extent in the 
mind of each participant as to the evaluative and orientative meanings of actions.
Fifth, taking Guildenstern’s point of view since he has the obligation to act, 
Guildenstern, in evaluating (in advance of acting) his intended social action and 
orienting his action by reference to a social norm which makes implicit or explicit 
reference to Rosencrantz, acts socially in the sense that he takes account of 
Rosencrantz, or of his expected responsive behaviour. In this sense, Guildenstern at 
each stage of the process, from ’pre-action’ until ’post-action’ imaginatively links 
’himselF or his imagined intended future, then present, then past action (all of which 
correspond to the act of sweeping the floor at the appropriate time) with Rosencrantz 
by virtue of the social norm in terms of all or any of the linking factors already 
mentioned. But other factors can be mentioned: for example, whether Guildenstern 
considers that his action will please Rosencrantz, or fulfil Rosencrantz’s expectations, 
or give Rosencrantz ’no reason’ to criticise him or to punish him, and so on.
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Sixth, taking Rosencrantz’s point of view, his role is essentially passive in that he need 
not ’act’ (overtly) to comply, like Guildenstern, with the social norm. Nevertheless, 
Rosencrantz presumably has an interest in having his expectation fulfilled that 
Guildenstern comply with the obligation prescribed by the social norm. To this extent 
Rosencrantz may, in acting meaningfully, take account of Guildenstern’s behaviour ex 
post facto in terms of, for example, categorising it as compliant or non-compliant 
action, this being the evaluative normative meaning which Rosencrantz ascribes to 
Guildenstern’s action. This may then constitute a basis for Rosencrantz’s action. 
Throughout this process, however, Rosencrantz, like Guildenstern, ideatively links 
’himseir or his imagined intended future, present and past action with Guildenstern, 
again by virtue of the social norm in terms of all or any of the linking factors already 
mentioned, but essentially reflecting Rosencrantz’s passive role, the point being that he 
need only ’expect’ Guildenstern to fulfil his obligation and need not ’act’ in order to 
fulfil an obligation (like Guildenstern). But he may well ’act* in consequence, for 
example, of Guildenstern’s fulfilling, or failing to fulfil his obligation.
Thus the normative relationality of the social action of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern 
respectively lies in the intersubjectivity of ideas about their own and each other’s
i
normative positions in the sense that at various points there exist identity of ideas, or 
minimally, similarity or resemblance of ideas, but sufficient, certainly, to enable each 
participant to conceive an ideative linkage by reference to an appropriate social norm 
governing their interaction.
It is possible then, in this sense, to refer to the normative situation obtaining between 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern as a normative relationship given that each participant,
114
whether consciously or unconsciously, conceives of his situation relative to the other 
participant in terms o f its relationality. This relationality derives from the linking 
medium of social norms, or other such media, e.g. ties of affection, which define at 
least in part the actual obligatory or expected behaviour of participants. It follows 
that someone other than the immediate participants (for example, an investigator) 
based on his experience of similar relationships with others may thus empathically 
ascribe the quality of relationality to the subjective meaning of the action of 
interacting participants. Such an ascription would furthermore be based on the 
assumption derived from experience that relationality of this type actually constitutes 
an aspect of subjective meaning.
In the same way, an investigator may comprehend the action of someone who himself 
ascribes normative relationality to the past, present or future (hypothetical) action of 
others with a view to the orientation of his own action. This is important in the 
present context in that if we attempt a sociological inquiry into judicial action we find 
that a judge conceives normative relationships as obtaining between individuals based 
upon their (or others’) action or upon natural occurrences attributed to such action. 
His conception, as we shall later argue, is specifically in terms of jural relations.
If a judge orients his action subjectively meaningfully by reference to a jural relation 
which he conceives as obtaining between litigants, in terms of the linking medium of a 
legal norm, then arguably sociological interest must focus on the jural relation as a 
component of the action of the judge. But interest should not be diverted from the 
action of others, such as solicitors, advocates, bankers, accountants, and so on. The 
point here is that other categories of actors, or position-occupants, may attempt to 
orient their action by reference to the same, or similar, criteria used by judges. This
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is because, firstly, they ascribe the quality of ’authoritativeness* to judicial 
pronouncements, and secondly, they treat as worthy of close attention any modes of 
legal thought or reasoning employed by a judge in issuing a judgment which leads to 
the mobilisation of a ’coercive apparatus’. The ’coercive apparatus’ in question can be 
relied upon to take action, coercive or otherwise, in order to give effect to such a 
judgment.
This much has been said before, but in the present context it is the concept of the 
jural relation as an ideative device employed in legal reasoning that is important 
precisely because it is a constituent of the subjective meaning of causally significant 
modes of social action.
Before considering how the concept of the jural relation fits into the general notion of 
legal meaning it is helpful to return to a theme which was not fully explored at the 
conclusion of part 4 of this chapter: that of the relationships obtaining between 
(firstly) player and player and (secondly) each player and umpire in the context of a 
process of interaction such as a game. A preliminary examination of the nature and 
content of these relationships might enable us to identify similarities between these 
relationships and those which obtain between litigants and the judge in the context of 
litigation before courts of law.
III.6 Relationality in the Game Model
As a starting point, we may recall that the following differences were noted as to the 
activities of players and umpire respectively. In the first place, the umpire does not
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do what the players do. He ’umpires* or adjudicates, he does not play the game. But 
depending on the nature of the relationship between umpire and players, what the 
players do will be affected by what the umpire does if he is called upon to make a 
ruling, while conversely, what the umpire does will be affected by what the players 
do.
In the second place, the normative meaning which in the course of the game a player 
ascribes to his own action and to the action of his opposite number with a view to the 
orientation of his own action, may, again depending on the nature of the player-player 
and player-umpire relationships, though it need not necessarily in the case of either 
player, differ  from that which the umpire ascribes to the actions of each player, with 
a view to the orientation of his own (adjudicatory) social action.
These differences accentuate the interdependence of the relationships involved and this 
is revealed in the manner in which the social norms are contentually linked. For 
example a duty under norm x may be dependent upon the perceived violation of a 
duty under norm y.
It is helpful now to consider the interdependence of the relationships described by 
reference to the game paradigm. In this way we may understand not only the nature 
and content of the relationships in question, but also the nature of contentual linkages 
between norms.
In the game model, let us imagine firstly that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern agree to 
play chess according to the rules. These may be expressly declared in an 
’authoritative* source. But authoritative statement of the rules is by no means
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necessary. All that is necessary is that the rules must be known to the players 
otherwise the normative meanings of acts may not be shared by them. Thus, given 
that the players subject their meaningful interaction to governance in terms of rules, 
the content of the relationship obtaining between them may be articulated in terms of 
expectations (or rights) and obligations (or duties).
For convenience, we will distinguish player-player relationships from player-umpire 
relationships. The former will be termed substantive relationships and the latter 
adjective relationships.40 The point of this distinction is that adjective relationships are 
predicated upon, and their content is partly determined by norms defining substantive 
relationships. To that extent the relationships are interdependent in the sense already 
considered. More fundamentally, adjective norms define the content of the umpire's 
action.
We should imagine secondly that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern by agreement establish 
a system of adjective relationships between themselves and Hamlet in his role as 
umpire. This may involve norms which confer upon Hamlet a power to make an 
authoritative ruling on any disputed question arising between Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern in the course of the game. Any such ruling relates to the substantive 
relationship between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern as defined by the rules of the 
game. In terms of the adjective norms, a ruling by Hamlet is a basis for the 
orientation of the players* action and has the same ’status* as any uncontroversial or 
unchallenged move by a player in that it ’induces’ a responsive action by the player to 
whom it applies.
To clarify matters further, let us suppose that the adjective relationships between
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Hamlet and the players are governed by the following (Hohfeldian) normative power, 
e.g.:
Hamlet has a power in a question with each player (on being so requested), to 
make a final and binding ruling with respect to any disputed matter arising 
during the course of the game relating to the conduct of play.
Now without pre-empting the discussion in chapter V of Hohfeldian legal powers and 
in order to fix ideas, it is useful to make some preliminary observations on the nature 
and function of normative powers in order to understand the adjective relationships 
obtaining between Hamlet and the players in the example given. As we will later 
consider, there are certain power-liability norms which confer upon the person of 
inherence (or power-holder) not merely a specific right that another (i.e. a person of 
incidence or liability-bearer) should act in a certain manner (e.g. 0) but a range or 
spectrum of possible rights, defined in the norm, which the person of inherence may 
have in a question with the person of incidence. This spectrum of rights depends 
upon, firstly, the discretion of the person of inherence, secondly, the exercise of the 
power (which concretises the relationship into a right-duty relationship), and thirdly, 
the validity of the power exercise: i.e. whether it is intra vires or ultra vires with 
respect to the power-liability norm.
The scope of the discretion which the person of inherence has is defined in the norm. 
For instance, there may be discretion in the choice of person of incidence, or in the 
content of the right arising on the exercise of the power, and in the appropriateness of 
the ’facts’ inducing a power exercise. In the example, the assumption is that 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern have conferred power upon Hamlet to the effect that 
their actions will be subject to Hamlet’s ’rulings’ with regard to the conduct of play. 
To that extent, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern voluntarily restrict their freedom of
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action by subjecting it to Hamlet’s adjudicatory power.
The relationship between Hamlet and each player concretises into a right-duty 
relationship upon Hamlet’s exercising his power in a given case. It follows that by 
virtue of the (unexercised) power, the possibility exists of innumerable (individuated) 
right-duty relationships obtaining between Hamlet and each player. The following are 
examples: a right as against Rosencrantz to make a ruling that a diagonal movement of 
his rook is unlawful; a right as against Guildenstern to make a ruling that a lateral 
movement of his bishop is unlawful; a right as against Rosencrantz to make a ruling 
that a reverse movement of his pawn is unlawful; a right as against either player to 
make a ruling that a delay in making a move, if deemed unreasonable by Hamlet, is 
unlawful; and so on.
The content of a right-duty relationship between Hamlet and either player upon the 
(valid) exercise of a power is determined by the content of a ruling. For example, 
Hamlet might order that an unlawfully moved rook be returned to its original place, 
and that another (lawful) move be made. The power-liability norm may additionally 
empower Hamlet to impose a discretionary penalty.
It is a question of ’validity’ whether any ruling issued by Hamlet is accepted by the 
participants as a sufficient basis for orientation of action. The validity of any ruling 
or penalty depends on whether it is intra vires the power conferred. Thus, a judgment 
is made as to whether the ruling is ’conceptually within’ the power, the scope of which 
is descriptively given in the norm.
Examining more closely the relationships obtaining between Hamlet, Rosencrantz and
1 2 0
Guildenstern, we find that there are several systems of (actual or potential) 
relationships here: (1) those between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern (substantive), (2) 
those between Hamlet and Rosencrantz (adjective) and (3) those between Hamlet and 
Guildenstern (adjective). Unless Hamlet is called upon to give a ruling, the system of
relationships obtaining between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern is defined solely by
substantive norms, i.e. the rules of the game. If Hamlet gives a ruling, the system of
relationships obtaining between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern is defined by a more
complex normative regime which includes the following elements: (1) the substantive 
norms directly governing the Rosencrantz-Guildenstern relationship (the rules of the 
game); (2) the adjective norms governing the Hamlet-Rosencrantz and 
Hamlet-Guildenstern relationships (’adjudicatory’ power-liability norms) and (3) the 
ruling itself.
A ruling may redefine the substantive relationships but specifically addressing any 
issue in dispute. Alternatively, it may only reaffirm the position obtaining between 
the players as they already understand it, but it may be that in requesting Hamlet’s 
intervention the players merely seek the benefit of a third-party opinion. As a 
deontic proposition, the ruling functions for each player not only as a reference point 
for the evaluation and orientation of his action but for the evaluation by him of the 
action of his opposite number with a view to the orientation of his action.
The matter, of course, is not exhaustively accounted for in terms of substantive 
relationships obtaining between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern as ’varied’ by Hamlet’s 
ruling. For, as we have seen, there are two further quite distinct systems of normative 
relationships obtaining between the participants: those between Hamlet and
Rosencrantz and between Hamlet and Guildenstern.
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If we seek to examine the subjective meaning of judicial action based on the 
simplified situation of the umpire (Hamlet) in the chess game model, it is necessary to 
grasp the relationships obtaining between the interacting participants as conceived by, 
and from the point of view of, the umpire, rather than as conceived by, and from the 
point of view of, any player. The assumption here is that the umpire’s action is 
similar to judicial action.
In the model Hamlet conceives a system of relationships as obtaining between himself 
and each player by reference to adjective norms. He also conceives a system of 
relationships as obtaining between the players by reference to substantive norms. In 
the latter case, ego (Hamlet) uses a social norm as a medium by which alter l ’s 
(Rosencrantz’s) past, present or (hypothetical) future action is normatively linked to 
alter 2’s (Guildenstern’s) past, present or (hypothetical) future action, but as a basis for 
the evaluation and orientation of ego’s action.
Hamlet’s action then, is oriented firstly, by reference to the power-liability norm 
governing his conduct in relation to the players according to his conception. Secondly, 
given the contentual linkage between that norm and the rules of the game, his action 
is oriented by reference to the rules of the game themselves, so far as governing the 
conduct of the players with respect to one another. Again, this is according to 
Hamlet's conception.
To make the analysis more concrete it may be helpful now to reformulate the 
power-liability norm suggested above in a way that illustrates the various relationships 
in the model and the contentual linkage between the power-liability norm and the
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rules of the game. Thus,
Hamlet has a power in a question with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern (on being 
so requested) to make a final and binding ruling with respect to any disputed 
matter arising during the course of the game relating to the conduct of play so 
far as such conduct is governed by the rules o f the game.
As we can see, this extended version of the power-liability norm is predicated upon 
the rules of the game in that a ruling falls to be made with regard to any disputed 
matter which arises between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern during the game so far as 
the conduct of play as between the players is governed by those rules.
Although the focus of our concern is Hamlet’s perspective, it is not suggested that the 
way in which any one participant conceives of his own and the other participants’ 
action in relational terms would necessarily differ in terms of content as from player 
to player or player to umpire. But in a more inclusive context of meaning41 Hamlet’s 
conception of the substantive relationships between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern (or 
any of the other relationships in the model) may well differ substantially from a 
player’s conception of those relationships.
In a wider context of meaning, relationships are not strictly defined by the letter of 
the norms governing the action in question. Other components of meaning enter the 
frame of reference. To give an example, in the course of the game Rosencrantz is 
certain to be influenced by the fact that he is personally involved and has a ’stake’ in 
the outcome. By contrast, Hamlet in his role as umpire may be guided by a principle 
of impartiality in terms of which personal factors will be suppressed.
Taking the example further, it may be a rule of the game that each player should not 
take an unreasonable time to make a move. In such a case, what Hamlet considers
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unreasonable may differ from what Rosencrantz and Guildenstern consider 
unreasonable. The same piece of action, or of inaction, when viewed from contrasting 
perspectives and according to differing interests may well bear a different normative 
meaning, even where the same norms are applied with a view to the evaluation of the 
action or inaction in question. This is especially true of an umpiring situation where 
the umpire in a sense stands outside the game and ideally distances himself from the 
essentially personal factors which motivate the players.
The main components of relationality to be found in the subjective meaning of 
Hamlet’s action, then, can be summarised as follows.
Hamlet conceives of his own action qua umpire in relational terms with respect to the 
action of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern by reference to a power-liability norm. His 
action consists of making ’rulings’. The adjective relationships which he conceives as 
obtaining, on the one hand, between himself and Rosencrantz, and on the other hand, 
between himself and Guildenstern are predicated upon the substantive relationships 
which he conceives as obtaining between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. It may be 
helpful to illustrate this diagrammatically. In the diagram the broken line represents 
adjective normative relationships, while the continuous line represents substantive 
normative relationships. Letters in circles represent, respectively, Hamlet, 
Guildenstern and Rosencrantz.
Fig. 1 ’represents’ Hamlet’s conception of the substantive normative relationship 
obtaining between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern by reference to the rules of the 
game.
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Fig. 1
Fig. 2 ’represents' Hamlet’s conception of the adjective normative relationships 
obtaining between himself and each player, there being two systems of such 
relationships. These subsume the substantive normative relationships obtaining between 
the players.
Taking as an example the Hamlet-Rosencrantz relationship, Hamlet may conceive a 
substantive relationship as obtaining between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern in terms 
that (1) Rosencrantz has a duty in a question with Guildenstern to reinstate an 
unlawfully moved bishop to its starting point, and (2) Guildenstern has a 
corresponding right that Rosencrantz reinstate the bishop accordingly. This represents
/
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S
Fig. 2
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certainly the core of the substantive relationship obtaining between Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern according to Hamlet's conception. Of course, Rosencrantz may not think 
that he is under any duty to reinstate the bishop, for whatever reason, and may 
therefore see the content of the substantive relationship in a different way.
Given this conception of the substantive relationship obtaining between Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstern, Hamlet may then make a ruling that Rosencrantz reinstate the 
bishop. In so doing, Hamlet conceives of the adjective relationship obtaining between 
himself and Rosencrantz in terms that Rosencrantz has a duty in a question with 
Hamlet to reinstate the unlawfully moved bishop, this being by virtue inter alia of the 
fact that Rosencrantz also has that duty in a question with Guildenstern.
Now in conceiving of any relationship between himself and a player (adjective) or 
between a player and a player (substantive), Hamlet confers evaluative normative 
meaning upon the action of the player as part of the subjective meaning of his own 
action, and orients his action accordingly. Hamlet therefore continuously ascribes 
normative meaning both to his own action (past, present and intended future) and to 
the action of the players (past, present and anticipated future). Actual or hypothetical 
action is thus at all times categorised or re-categorised in terms of its meaning as a 
basis or potential basis for the orientation of Hamlet’s action.
For example, a ’request’ by Guildenstern to intervene by making an appropriate ruling 
in the event of Rosencrantz’s making an unlawful move involves Hamlet in making a 
number of judgments of normative meaning, including (1) categorising Rosencrantz’s 
move as ’unlawful’ by reference to appropriate rules of the game, (2) categorising the 
situation obtaining between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern following an unlawful move
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as (say) a ’dispute* within the meaning of the power-liability norm, and (3) 
categorising Guildenstern’s request for Hamlet’s intervention as a ’request’ within the 
meaning of the power-liability norm.
Hamlet may also consider whether the dispute in question is within his ’jurisdiction* in 
the sense that if it is not a ’dispute’ concerning the playing of the game (for example, 
a dispute about cold coffee) then it will be outside his remit, and it will not be 
competent for him to make a valid ruling with respect to it. He may also consider 
whether he has been properly ’requested* to make a ruling as one of the players may 
only seek an informal opinion rather than the full Majesty of a formal ruling.
In advance of making a ruling, Hamlet may also question whether the content of his 
intended ruling will be conceptually within (intra vires) the scope of the 
power-liability norm, and therefore constitute a valid power exercise. He may do this 
in the expectation that if the ruling should be ultra vires it may not constitute, 
whether for Rosencrantz or Guildenstern, a legitimate basis for the orientation of their 
action in compliance with the ruling.
A further consideration is that there may be implied by the power-liability norm a 
right-duty relationship in terms of which Hamlet actually has a duty to make a ruling 
on being so requested by a player. In this situation each player has a corresponding 
right that Hamlet should make a ruling if requested. It would follow that Hamlet had 
both a power and a duty to make a ruling, and the exercise of the power (i.e. the 
making of a ruling) would give him a right in a question with the player to whom the 
ruling applied that the player in question act in the manner specified in the ruling.
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Finally throughout this process Hamlet ascribes meaning to the social norms themselves 
in their application to the action to which they are relevant. The norms are, of 
course, open to numerous interpretations, both in abstracto and in application to 
concrete instances of action. The meaning which Hamlet confers upon the norms may 
well differ from that which the players confer upon them, and to that extent the 
’finality’ of the ruling may depend upon the meaning which Hamlet (qua umpire) 
confers upon the appropriate norms.
This concludes our discussion of the ’relational’ components of the subjective meaning 
of the umpire’s action and prepares the way for an examination of legal meaning. Just 
as substantive and adjective relationships obtaining between and among interacting 
participants in the chess game model have been considered from the perspective of the 
umpire with a view to understanding the umpire’s action, our analysis of the legal 
meaning ascribed to human action, or other ’facts’ for legal purposes should be treated 
as part of the subjective meaning of judicial action. For this purpose, legal meaning 
is considered to flow from the ultimate judicial perspective outlined in Chapter VI.
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